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Time for a new Global Governance Paradigm

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Introduction

For those of us who have been following political and socio-economic trends since the end of the Cold War, our world has seemingly become increasingly ungovernable. The Post-Cold War period has been marked by the intensification of globalization, with all its attendant negative effects. It has also been characterized as an era that has ushered in a new world disorder. Yet, we have institutions of global governance that are supposed to manage and address the global problems we face and to steer us into a future that is more peaceful, stable, equitable, just, sustainable and prosperous.

The targets set for the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the concomitant 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals and its 169 targets) certainly offer a normative desire and strengthened global solidarity on the part of the member-states of the United Nations system to try to establish some semblance of global governance via the institutions and agencies of this seventy-year old organization.

I argue here that the extant institutions of global governance, including but not limited to the UN, are more or less "decisions frozen in time", created at an historical juncture when sovereignty-bound entities reigned supreme. Today, those institutions are being forced to operate in a turbulent complex interdependent and "intermestic" era in which sovereign-free and sovereignty-bound actors compete and jostle for position on the global stage. The problem is that, under the ellipsoidal glare and intensity of the spotlight, post-World War II institutions of global governance are revealing themselves to be defective, inefficient, ineffective, and largely irrelevant in the twenty-first century.

The crisis of global governance at this point in our history has triggered an intense and growing interest in governance at all levels. I argue here that the time is ripe for a reconceptualization of global governance and for the construction of a new global governance paradigm. To do so, I recommend a shift from problem-solving theorization to an embrace of a critical theory approach that stands outside prevailing understandings of what global governance has come to mean. In the Gramscian tradition of Robert Cox, one of my great mentors, I propose that we empirically examine the patchwork concoction that we call the "global governance" architecture and describe what the late James Rosenau termed as the post-Cold War "fragmegrative"[1] and complex environment within which that architecture was constructed.

Only then will it become clear that the time has come for us to focus not so much on reform and adaptation of those institutions but rather on the transformation of the very conception and raison d'être of "global governance", in the absence of world government. This, of course, requires a Kuhnian paradigm shift away from the state-centric idea of "international", anarchic, and hierarchic governance to one that embodies notions of heterarchic, multi-centric authority and subsidiarity arrangements[2] that are more conducive to self-organizing steering of multiple and multilevel agencies (state and non-state, public and private) which can be operationally autonomous "yet structurally coupled due to their mutual interdependence."[3]

The New World Disorder

Global politics in the early part of the twenty-first century has been dominated by gruesome acts of rampant terrorism, multilateral and unilateral reprisals, global economic downturns, mounting civil strife, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This turbulent time reveals cracks, if not a total breakdown, in the prevailing global order and has led to ever-louder demands for the establishment

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[1] James Rosenau used the term 'fragmegrative' to describe the paradoxical trend, during a period of intense globalization and the unravelling of world order, of clashes between forces of fragmentation and those of integration. See James N. Rosenau, *Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).

[2] On Subsidiarity arrangements see W. Andy Knight, "Towards a Subsidiarity Model for Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy: Making Chapter VIII of the UN Charter Operational, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 31-52.

[3] See Bob Jessop, "The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure: The case of Economic Development," *International Social Science Journal*, no. 155 (1998), p.29.

of new institutions of global governance to replace, or at least complement, the worn existing ones.

This is not the first time in world history when prevailing systems of governance have been challenged by pronounced structural forces for change. In past centuries, there have been repeated attempts at reforming existing institutions or creating new ones to tame the conflicts and disorders of those periods.[4] More recently, during the immediate post-Cold War period, we witnessed the removal of some of the structural and ideological underpinnings of superpower conflict that characterized the last half of the previous century. Apart from relaxing global tensions, this changed structural condition ostensibly reduced the major security threat that the world faced during the Cold War, viz., the threat of nuclear war between two heavily armed military camps that could have resulted in Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

But the end of that precarious balance of power between the two superpowers (the USA and the USSR) created a climate of uncertainty with the rise in a number of civil conflicts and the spread of internecine violence in places like Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and the former Yugoslavia. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been approximately 93 conflicts around the world in which over 5.5 million people were killed – 75% of them being civilians.[5] Almost all of these conflicts were intra-state, thus explaining the disproportionate number of civilian casualties.

This immediate post-Cold War period was also characterized by an exponential increase in transnational challenges. Some of these challenges included: the horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the spike in the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW); the spread of hate material and ideologies of hate; the increased consumption of pornography and sex slavery; computer hacking and cyber theft; an increase in drug trafficking; trafficking in women and children; an increase in mass migration and the number of internally displaced persons; forced labour and organized criminal activity; financial and

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[4] W. Andy Knight, "Global Governance and World (Dis)orders," in Janine Brodie & Sandra Rein (eds.), *Critical Concepts: An Introduction to Politics*, 3rd edition (Toronto: Pearson Education Canada, 2005), pp.252-263.
[5] These figures were calculated until 2004. Since then the numbers of conflicts and the numbers of those killed in conflicts have risen exponentially. Thomas Keating & W. Andy Knight (eds.), *Building Sustainable Peace* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press and Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004), pp.1-4.

market collapses; piracy on the high seas (especially in the Malacca straits and off the coasts of Somalia and Nigeria); the circumvention of national regulatory policies and taxes, etc.,

Clearly, "…the national institutions that are supposed to express people's preferences in these matters are increasingly ineffective in coping with them."[6] The post-World War II institutions that were designed to address interstate issues were all of a sudden showing signs, at the end of the Cold War era, not only of ineffectiveness but also of irrelevance. And many of the regional institutions did not fare any better. This raised the alert amongst scholars and practitioners of the need for a new global governance architecture which would effectively deal with transnational and intermestic issues.

The debacle in Somalia, the Rwandan genocide, the at times indiscriminate but politically motivated slaughter in the DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mozambique, Cote D'Ivoire, and the continued violence in other places such as the Middle East, Asia, Chechnya, and Latin America all indicated a persistent adherence to a culture of violence as hyper-nationalism, terrorism and long-suppressed ethnic conflicts reared their ugly heads in the latter part of the twentieth century.

Other human tragedies and gross human rights violations occurred in so-called failed states where the degeneration or total absence of national governance structures meant that civilians were particularly vulnerable to random acts of violence (kidnappings, murders, sexual assaults). Millions of innocent people fleeing violence became refugees and displaced persons – and thousands of children have been, and continue to be, recruited as child soldiers by both government and rebel forces.

The destruction of national infrastructures and of governmental and societal institutions worth billions of dollars was due at times to internecine violence but also at other times to natural and man-made disasters during this immediate post-Cold War period. Again, national governments found it difficult to address the spill-over problems associated with internal conflicts and humanitarian disasters. Similarly, international governmental organization (IGOs), like the UN system, and regional intergovernmental bodies, like the African Union, were

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[6] Amitai Etzioni, "Beyond Transnational Governance," *International Journal* (Autumn 2001), pp.595-610.

struggling to cope with the increasingly transnational and intermestic nature of these problems.

In general, the narrative I just painted is a panoramic picture of what can only be referred to as "a new world disorder" – an environment of turbulence, flux, fragmentation, disequilibrium and uncertainty which cries out for the establishment of novel forms of governance activity and institutions, since the existing ones seem ineffectual. But this picture is only one part of the puzzle. There are other integrative/fragmentary forces at work which are also putting pressure on the existing international governance architecture.

Complex Interdependence and Globalization forces

The late James Rosenau alerted us to some of the ways in which the advent of dynamic technologies has resulted in a decline of distances in the modern world (what he called 'distant proximities'). Technological advances in communications and transportation have resulted in an increase in the level of complex interdependence (to use a phrase coined by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye).[7]

Modern communications (in the form of newspapers, radio, television, telephones, fax machines, computers, the internet, e-mail, social media) appear to be producing contradictory outcomes: uniting and fragmenting audiences; exacerbating social cleavages as well as bringing disparate groups together; heightening existing antagonisms as well as providing means through which such friction can be resolved; eroding national boundaries as well as propelling ultra-nationalist fervour; increasing political cynicism as well as raising the level of civil society's political consciousness. Individual citizens have been empowered as the result of the media's influence. At the same time, because of their adeptness with the utilization of modern communications systems, state leaders have also been empowered vis-à-vis civil society. Modern transportation has allowed people of formerly distant societies to interact more frequently. It acts as a conduit for bringing individuals from different countries with similar interests together. But it has also served to facilitate transnational criminal activities.

The overall effect of the above has been shrinkage in social, political, economic, and cultural distances. As a consequence of this phenomenon, formerly dense and opaque frontiers are being dissolved, thus breaking down the Westphalian

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[7] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), chapter 2.

notion of 'inside versus outside'. National boundaries are no longer able to divide friend from foe. Indeed, the technological revolution has the potential for creating in the minds of people around the world a sense of global citizenship which could result eventually in the transfer of individuals' loyalties from 'sovereignty-bound' to 'sovereignty-free' governance bodies.

The changing relationship between the public and private spheres and the virtual collapse of the dividing line separating the domestic from the external environment suggest a fluid but closely integrated global system substantially at odds with the notion of a fragmented system of nationally delineated sovereign states.[8] However, it does not yet mean that a global civil society has been formed, although one can argue that such an entity is in the process of being established, as will be shown later.

Aided by the technological revolution, globalization has contributed to global space and time shrinkage. The globalization of trade, production and finance has resulted in a marked decline in some governments' ability to control these sectors and has challenged the traditional concept of state sovereignty.[9] It has also expanded the number of players that can be involved in multilateral processes. The globalization movement and the seemingly paradoxical adherence to territorialism are two concepts of world order that stand in conflict but are also interrelated. The globalization of economic processes "requires the backing of territorially-based state power to enforce its rules."[10] But post-Fordism, the new pattern of social organization of production that is congruent with the globalization phenomenon, implicitly contradicts the lingering territorial principle that has long been identified with Fordism.

The results of post-Fordist production have been, *inter alia*, the dismantling of the welfare state and the diminishing of the strength of organized labour. But it also has had the effect of increasingly fragmenting power in the world system, providing fodder for "the possibility of culturally diverse alternatives to global homogenization."[11] If Robert Cox is right, we can see how this dialectical 'double

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[88] Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992), p.88.

[9] James Mittelman, "Rethinking Innovation in International Studies: Global Transformation at the turn of the Millennium," in Stephen Gill and J. H. Mittelman (eds.), *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.248-263.

[10] Robert W. Cox, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.278.

[11] Ibid. p.155.

movement' of the globalization process can alter the relationship people have with the political arena and how it can eventually cause a reaction leading to what James Rosenau terms "explosive sub-groupism,"[12] as seen in the many anti-globalization protests. This sub-groupism has already spurred the revival of what can be called civilizational studies that are further unearthing anti-globalization movements and ideas, and a bottom-up form of governance.

There are other ways in which globalization is facilitating the dissolution of formerly dense and opaque boundaries. For instance, economic globalization has resulted in a global division of labour that hardly respects state boundaries and sovereignty. It has to a large extent been responsible for the feminization of work, particularly in the developing world, which penetrates traditional gender boundaries. The international movement of capital via electronic transfers has also had a major effect on the relocation of authority and power structures.[13]

Similarly, media globalization – via satellite new networks like CNN, the BBC, al Jazeera, and the internet superhighway – has contributed to the diffusion of power. Its impact raises the possibility of the development of a truly global civil society; something that could again transform the nature of multilateralism and the way we view governance.

Finally, another challenge to the traditional notion of multilateralism and governance has to do with transnational and intermestic issues: for example, environmental pollution; global warming; currency crises; the drug trade; human rights degeneration; terrorism; the AIDS, SARS and Ebola epidemics, Non-Communicable Diseases; refugee flows; gender inequality, etc.. These issues, by their very nature, all impel cooperation on a transnational scale, since in the majority of cases they cannot be resolved by individual states acting on their own or even bilaterally.

Multi-centric actors have pushed many of the issues onto the global agenda. The impact of the multiplication of transnational and intermestic issues is that the state-centric multilateral intergovernmental institutions have had to find ways of acknowledging, if not embracing, the input of NGOs and other civil society actors who formerly would not have been considered important players on the

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[12] James N. Rosenau, *Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
[13] Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

international stage. The alternative of not embracing these entities could very well be the establishment of parallel multilateral arrangements that by-pass existing state-centric multilateral bodies or compete with them.

As James Rosenau reminded us, we live in a messy world, a world that seems in disarray due to high levels of poverty, division, ethnic and cultural conflicts, terrorism, over population, pollution and other forms of environmental degradation.[14] Our world is a postmodern one of extraordinary complexity and uncertainty as contradictory forces are unleashed by the intensification of globalization. It is a world in which integrative forces coexist alongside fragmentary ones, and homogenization is being challenged by civilizational diversity.

What is clear from my overview is that complex interdependence and globalization phenomena have challenged international governance and raised the possibility of developing other forms of governance at the global level that can adequately address transnational and intermestic issues and problems.

Evolving Governance at the Global Level

While the term 'global governance' is relatively new, the word 'governance' has a long tradition.[15] Etymological searches reveal that the term can be traced back to classical Latin and Greek words for the "steering of boats." Originally, the word 'governance' therefore referred to the action or way of managing or coordinating interdependent activities.

Throughout history there have been attempts to manage the interactions of peoples, clans, tribes, city-states, and states to ensure harmonious relations or deal with common problems. One can find examples of various forms of governance over the course of history, including empires/imperialism, balance of power, plurilateralism, formal and informal limited purpose intergovernmental organizations, formal and informal multipurpose international organizations, regional intergovernmental organizations, transnational international non-

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[14] James N. Rosenau, "Governance in a new Global Order," in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), *Governing Globalization*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p.223.

[15] Anthony Pagden, "The Genesis of Governance and Enlightenment Conceptions of the Cosmopolitan World Order," *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 50, no. 1 (1998), pp.7-15; Craig Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).

governmental organizations (INGOs), and embryonic global governance institutions.

The form of governance labelled as empires has a long association with imperialism. This form of governance has recurred at different points in history and in many different regions of the globe. Imperialism provides the ideology underpinning this form of governance. Imperial powers exercise dominance and control over the subjugated regions they conquer. As a result, they develop a form of governance that is based on power asymmetries, coercion, and attempts to enforce homogeneity. One can find evidence of governance by empires when the Greek city-state of Athens was a dominant power. But this form of governance has reappeared at different junctures in history, including during our contemporary period.[16] And each time it has appeared, it manages to provoke resistance, among those subjugated to this form of governance. Imperial powers have usually declined due in large part to military, economic and imperial overstretch

Another prominent form of governance has been the balance of power system. This form of governance emerged after the peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the creation of the modern states system. It became the principle mechanism for maintaining international order in Europe. Underpinning the balance of power system were the ideological notions of self-preservation, particularly for those states that were predominant, and the preservation of the status quo. To accomplish these two things, the great powers of the day would use this balance of powered mechanism of governance to prevent the emergence of a hegemonic or imperial power and prevent upstart powers from advancing up the hierarchical power ladder.

Although diplomacy was utilized to manage the relations between states in the Euro-centric balance of power system, at other times balance of power governance utilized violent conflict to maintain equilibrium in the international system. War, or the threat of war, was used as a means of preserving equilibrium within the international system. Realists have described the balance of power well as one in which independent 'rational actor' states have little interaction beyond their borders, and one that emphasized order and stability.

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[16] See Michael W. Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), and also see Niall Ferguson, *Empire* (London: Basic Books, 2002).

By the nineteenth century, the balance of power form of governance gave way to a series of ad hoc and plurilateral conferences and congresses.[17] While this form of governance was generally limited to the European states system and controlled by the great powers of the time (member of the Concert of Europe), eventually it broadened to include states in Latin America and Asia – thus expanding the scope of plurilateral multilateralism. However, because the Congresses and Conferences were intermittent, this form of governance stopped short of establishing formal intergovernmental institutions. In fact, by the mid-nineteenth century, the Concert of Europe became the first attempt at formalizing intergovernmental organization to govern interstate relations as contact between states increased.[18]

Out of this interaction, state leaders became increasingly aware of the common problems they faced and of the need for formal institutional devices and systematic methods for regulating their behaviour and relationships. This governance via formal organizations and regimes was steered by the Great Power directorship of the Concert and included such activity as regulating traffic on the great rivers of Europe, adjusting relations between belligerent and neutral states, re-division of the Balkans and the carving up of the African continent.

However, while the great powers of the nineteenth century proved relatively successful in governing the subordinate states in the international system, problems arose when the dominant powers clashed among themselves. Since there was no higher power to mediate great power conflicts and those conflict open the door for rising powers to challenge the great powers, the Concert of Europe and the intermittent conference/congress system soon became ineffective and largely irrelevant. As Murphy recalls, in the late nineteenth century there were also other challenges coming from this form of governance from civil society organizations which began to establish a presence on the global stage. Such organizations included the anti-slavery movement and financial and corporate interests, as well as private associations.[19]

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[17] See W. Andy Knight, "Plurilateral Multilateralism: Canada's Emerging International Policy?" in Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands (eds.), *Canada among Nations, 2005: Split Images* (Ottawa: McGill/Queen's University Press, 2005), pp.93-114. Note the examples of the Congresses of Vienna, Paris and Berlin (1815, 1856, 1878 respectively); the London Conferences (1871 and 1912-1913); the Hague Conferences (1899 and 1907); and the Algeciras Conference of 1906.

[18] Inis Claude, jr., *Swords into Plowshares*, 4th edition (New York: Random House, 1971), p.21.

[19] Craig Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change*, pp.56-57.

This 'parallel' non-state system of governance, combined with emerging powers beyond Europe and a dramatic increase in the volume and scope of international activity, caused some major strains on the ad hoc conference/congress governance system. As Inis Claude puts it: "When all is said and done, the political conference system contributed more to awareness of the problems of international collaboration than to their solutions and more to opening up the possibilities of multilateral diplomacy than to realizing them."[20] But the conference/congress system did make a significant contribution to the institutionalization of modern-day multilateral/intergovernmental organization because it got European governments into the habit of meeting together to discuss and iron out problems of common concern.[21]

At the start of the twentieth century, great efforts were made to establish more formal institutions of governance at the international level. International public unions began to regulate telecommunications and postal systems. Between 1860 and 1914 about two dozen organizations were created to govern inter-state and transnational activity. Many of them were designed to foster industry and commerce, but most were focused on meeting social and economic needs as well as on managing a variety of conflicts stemming from the effects of the second industrial revolution and the increased volume and scale of interactions between states.[22] But note that there was a persistence of non-state organizations, like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – founded in 1919, that operated in parallel with state centric organizations on the world stage.

It took World War I to actualize the formal institutionalization of intergovernmental governance with the founding of organizations like the Permanent Court of International Justice and the League of Nations. Liberals have argued that the underlying cause of war was the balance of power's failure to maintain stability, order and ultimately peace. For this reason, Woodrow Wilson and other liberals sought to replace balance of power politics, with its ad hoc methods and reliance on military power and alliance politics, with a formal institutionalized system of law and conflict prevention mechanisms, including the collective security provisions outlined in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

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[20] Inis Claude, *Swords into Plowshares,* p.28.
[21] Craig Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change*, p. 56.
[22] Ibid. pp.32-37.

The League of Nations itself was an attempt to create an institutional framework to control war by eliminating or reducing states' concerns about security. The principle of collective security was seen as a remedy for the security dilemma that confronted states. A collective security system is based on a number of critical assumptions. It assumes that wars are principally the result of acts of aggression conducted by one state against another. It also assumes that such wars could be deterred if potential aggressors knew that their actions would be met with the combined force of all the other states in the system either in the form of harmful sanctions or, ultimately, with armed force. This brings into play other assumptions including, most importantly, the willingness of other states to respond collectively in the face of aggression.

Collective security rests on the premise of shared vulnerability among states. Yet, in practice, few states were willing to leave their security in the hands of the collective security instrument devised at the League of Nations. This was especially true for those states – Japan, Italy, and Germany – which were dissatisfied with the prevailing international order. As they sought their own solutions to interwar security issues, other states took notice and felt threatened.

So this governance system via a multipurpose intergovernmental organization, the League of Nations, did not last long. The League's inability to overcome the security dilemma has been seen by many as one of the greatest failures of the interwar period, leading to the outbreak of war on the European continent in 1939. Of course the League was not an entity on to itself, but rather it merely represented the collective will of its member governments.

The United States, one of the world's pre-eminent powers never took up membership and, by late 1930s, most of the disaffected powers – Germany, Japan, and Russia – had left this intergovernmental organization. Those powers that remained, principally Great Britain and France, were unwilling for a variety of domestic and foreign policy considerations to provide the League with the support it needed to respond to the political and military challenges that developed in the international system during the 1930s. Beginning with Japan's attack on Manchuria, through to Italy's annexation of Abyssinia and on to the German Anschluss of Czechoslovakia in 1939, the League and its member governments shamefully stood by and did nothing. Yet it would be somewhat misleading the lay the blame for World War II solely at the door of the League.

For some historians, the war that began in 1939 was a continuation of the European-wide war that had not ended in 1919, but merely paused as the combatants regained strength and armour. WWI had failed to resolve the pressing balance of power issues that had plagued the continent since the late nineteenth century. States such as Germany and Italy remained dissatisfied with their place in the European power structure. Germany, especially, suffered from the punitive measures imposed on it as part of the Treaty of Versailles. From the Germans' vantage point, there was much ground to recover. Added to all of these factors was, of course, the emergence of fascist regimes in Germany and Italy led respectively by Hitler and Mussolini. Hitler's ambitious expansionist plans posed a direct and significant challenge to European and international order and to the fledgling intergovernmental governance.   In light of these factors war became a matter of when, not if.

The demise of the League of Nations once World War II began clearly indicated that the system of governance via intergovernmental organizations needed to be reformed, at least.

In August 1941, just months before the US (the emerging great power) entered that war, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt joined with British PM Winston Churchill to establish what became known as the Atlantic Charter. That Charter formed the basis for the Declaration of the United Nations, which was signed on 1 January 1942 in San Francisco by some 26 governments. In essence, the declaration was an attempt to introduce a permanent governance system for ensuring general global security once the war was over.

The victorious Allied countries were envisioned to be at the centre of this new system which, in effect, was expected to constitute the institutionalization of the immediate post-1945 world order. In San Francisco, on 25 April 1945, two weeks before Roosevelt's death, the UN system was ushered into existence on the promise that it would not be a house of cards, like its ill-fated predecessor, but rather a stable and authoritarian base for global tranquillity and a mechanism for preserving international peace and security. The UN was supposed to be a much more powerful intergovernmental governance organization than was the League of Nations.

Whereas the Covenant of the League made no provision for that organization to be involved in direct military action, the UN Charter envisioned a military staff committee to oversee military enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions. While the Covenant had contemplated decision by unanimity, the Charter pictured a majority capable of binding all UN members, and in some cases non-members, to its determinations.

But there were many features of this governance form that were worth keeping. The Permanent institutional mechanism developed within the establishment of the League was preserved with the founding of the UN at the tail end of WWII. So too was the multipurpose infrastructure. Indeed, the institutionalization of the UN system was much more extensive than that of the League, with six main organs, a permanent secretariat and subsidiary bodies, as well as a large number of specialized agencies, functional commissions, regional commissions, committees, programmes, funds, research and training institutes and related and affiliated bodies.

The UN Charter listed some key governance goals for this multipurpose intergovernmental organization that went beyond the maintenance of international peace and security. These were as follows: developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; achieving international cooperation in solving global socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian problems; encouraging and promoting respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all; and, becoming the centre for harmonizing the actions of nations to attain the above common ends.

Over the years since 1945, the UN grew in size and mandate. Its Charter goals were extended to include protecting the global commons and encouraging democratization across the globe. One could add to these the recent goal of countering terrorism that is reflected in UN Security Council resolution 1373, passed on 28 September 2001 in response to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US.

While the main purpose of international governance under the UN system was to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", this intergovernmental organization is mandated to address a variety of other issues, for example,

economic development (UNDP), health (WHO), communications (ITU), human rights (OHCHR), refugees (UNHCR), women (UNIFEM), and children (UNICEF). The UN retains its support for state sovereignty as exemplified in its membership and its resistance (until recently) to intervention. It is for this reason that Rosenau considers it a 'sovereignty-bound' organization. It has been the principal forum in which newly independent states seek recognition and confirmation of their independence and sovereignty. At the same time, it has been pursued by human rights advocates as the organization through which the rights of individuals against the state are to be advanced and ultimately protected; and by civil society organizations to gain their own recognition and opportunities for participating in the process of global governance.

So, in essence, the UN – a sovereignty-bound organization – has had to find ways of accommodating non-state actors that pursue some of the same goals it shares with them. Elsewhere, I speak of this evolving multilateralism as the intersection of bottom-up and top-down global governance.[23]

It is clear, however, that this universal, intergovernmental organization has not always been successful in addressing many of the different representational concerns of its member governments. This explains the proliferation in the establishment of regional and sub-regional intergovernmental organizations (some multi-purpose and other single-purpose) as well as the attempts to construct alternative institutional frameworks (hybrid global governance bodies) to meet diverse sets of interests. In some cases, these bodies are viewed as alternatives of a complementary sort, but some of them can also be seen as alternatives that challenge the legitimacy, credibility and relevance of the UN.

If the contemporary global agenda seems crowded by the number and scope of activities that occur in so many different sectors, the response in governance terms is equally staggering. While the total number of governance mechanisms is seemingly countless, the variety is clearly evident. At the interstate level alone, there are numerous formal groupings: G2, G3, G7/8, G20, G21, G25, G77, and G90. There are also now the seemingly ubiquitous 'coalitions of the willing'.

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[23] W. Andy Knight, "Engineering Space in Global Governance: The Emergence of Civil Society in Evolving Multilateralism," in Michael Schechter (ed.), *Future Multilateralism: The Political and Social Foundations* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), pp. 255-291.

This considerable variety of intergovernmental bodies forms only one element of global governance. Tanja Bruhl and Volker Rittberger make a conceptual distinction between 'international' and 'global' governance. They suggest that international governance consists of the "output of a non-hierarchical network of interlocking international (mostly, but not exclusively, governmental) institutions which regulate the behaviour of states and other international actors in different issue areas of world politics." For them, global governance is the "output of a non-hierarchical network of international and transnational institutions; not only IGOs and international regimes but also transnational regimes are regulating actors' behaviour. In other words, they differentiate global governance from international governance by suggesting that in the case of the former there is a decreased salience of states and increased salience of non-state actors in the process of norm-building, rule-setting and compliance monitoring that occur at the global level.[24] They also equate global governance with multi-level governance involving the management if the above processes at sub-national, national. Regional, trans-regional and global levels.

Summative Governance: the new Paradigm

The recent interest in multi-level global governance stems, in large part, from a recognition of the scale of global change; the shrinkage of time and space witnessed over the past 70 years; the emergence of a transnational civil society;[25] rising interdependence among actors (state and non-state) within international society; the rise in the number and complexity of transnational and intermestic issues that cannot be addressed adequately by the UN intergovernmental system; and national governments' failure/inability not only to deal with the transnational and intermestic issues but also to provide common goods and security guarantees for their citizens.

Particularly since the end of WWII, we have witnessed at least three difference challenges to traditional Westphalian international governance as represented in institutions like the UN system. First, technological revolution has made it possible for many other actors besides states to enter on to the world stage and demand a role in decision-making that affects them directly. Second, the

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[24] Tanja Bruhl and Volker Rittberger, "From International to Global Governance: Actors, Collective Decision-making, and the United Nations in the World of the Twenty-first Century," in Volker Rittberger (ed.), *Global Governance and the United Nations System* (New York: UN University Press, 2001), p. 2.

[25] Ann M. Florini (ed.), *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).

intensification of globalization has altered the relationship between citizens, the state and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Globalization has facilitated greater participation of non-state actors in governance processes normally reserved for state actors. But because globalization is a double-edged sword, it has also made it easier for transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups to command the attention of governance bodies at all levels. It has also widened the gap between the rich and the poor, thereby increasing the challenge to intergovernmental bodies. Third, the end of the Cold War can be seen as a historical turning point for intergovernmental institution. It has resulted in an exponential expansion in the scope and agenda of IGOs, so much so that these organizations are having to contract out certain services.[26]

All three challenges have created new problems for governance, including the concept itself, and ensured that even more actors are involved in managing those problems. Apart from states and IGOs operating at multiple levels, today we have a plethora of non-state actors vying for attention on the world stage: transnational corporations, business associations, public-private consortia, bond-rating agencies, transnational social movements, transnational advocacy networks, epistemic communities, coalitions of non-governmental organizations, terrorists groups, security communities, and so on.

Recently, there have been a plethora of critical works that have tried to stand outside the prevailing thought about multilateralism and global governance to give those concepts meaning in what are considered to be changed circumstances. The most influential of these works was initiated by Robert Cox through his 'Multilateralism and the United Nations System (MUNS)' research project that began in 1992. Because the MUNS programme focused on long-term structural change, it was cognizant of attempts by the less powerful in society to create space for themselves in multilateral activity and for a. Indeed an explicit goal of the Fiesole symposium (1992) was the consideration of a future "new multilateralism built from the bottom up on the foundations of a broadly participative global society."[27] This bottom-up multilateralism is conceived as organic and network-based with discourse mechanisms as well as democratic structures to ensure accountability to the world's peoples. At the same time,

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[26] Thomas Weiss and Leon Gordenker (eds.), *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).*

[27] Robert W. Cox (ed.), *The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order* (New York: St. Martin's Press/UNU Press, 1997), see preface.

MUNS researchers were cognizant of the constraints imposed by the more powerful on the attempts of the less powerful to play a greater role in global governance.

What emerged from the volumes of literature published by MUNS was an expanded and historically sensitive view of multilateralism obtained through careful empirical observation as well as through the questioning of conventional and traditional analyses of the phenomenon. Multilateralism in the MUNS' orientation is accorded a broad meaning that encompasses all those entities that may be (or may become) relevant in dealing with general or sector-specific areas of policy that have relevance for the globe, whether they are trans-regional, regional, inter-state, state or sub-state. Thus, the units of analysis for the MUNS group not only included the state but also encompassed forces in civil society, above and below the state.[28]

Another related paradigmatic shift in conceptualizing both governance and multilateralism is linked to a movement towards establishing a post-Cold War global agenda that has given rise to what Richard Falk calls a potential 'counter-project' to that of post-Cold War geo-politics.[29] At the base of this counter-project is a normative pre-occupation with strengthening the role of civil society (sovereignty-free actors) in matters of world affairs at local, regional, global locales to balance the influence of sovereignty-bound actors. This is now generally viewed as an essential 'bottom-up' counter-balance to the state-centric 'top-down' views of world order and global governance that are so deeply entrenched in much of the neo-realist and liberal institutionalist thinking and scholarship. In some respects, this conception of the counter-project has been borne out in anti-globalization protests and peoples' movements.

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century proved to be a defining moment for bottom-up struggles against top-down governance at the global-level – what some have called a "Grotian Moment". For many commentators, this defining moment began at the end of 1999 when the WTO's Third Ministerial meeting collapsed because of the anti-globalization/capitalism protests in Seattle, Washington. But the contestations

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[28] See Keith Krause and W. Andy Knight (eds.), *State, Society, and the UN System: Changing Perspectives on Multilateralism (*Tokyo: UNU Press, 1995), p.261.
[29] Richard Falk, "From Geopolitics to Geogovernance: WOMP and Contemporary Political Discourse," *Alternatives*, vol. 19, no. 2 (spring 1994), pp.145-154

between governmental and intergovernmental bodies versus non-state actors can be traced earlier to the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the embrace of democratization in formerly authoritarian states. Mary Kaldor writes authoritatively about civil society movements that sprung up against authoritarian states and actually brought down some of those regimes.[30] The end of several authoritarian governments from Central and Eastern Europe – opened the door for the emergence of a number of social counter-movements. One should note as well that this wave coincided with the emergence of a transnational, militant Islamic movement as well as with the coalescing of a number of other social movements (environmentalists, feminists, slow food, human rights, indigenous peoples, Arab spring).

I consider the Seattle protests as the 'turning point' in the clash between bottom-up and top-down forces in the struggle for how the global economy will be governed in the future.[31] That particular protest involved an estimated 50,000 people, as well as "the rebellion of developing countries delegates inside the Seattle Convention Centre." Although it may have been difficult to pinpoint the position of all of the protesters, what unified them was "their opposition to the expansion of a system that promoted corporate-led globalization at the expense of social goals like justice, community, national sovereignty, cultural diversity, and ecological sustainability."[32] This protests was met by a major assault on a largely peaceful gathering by Seattle police in full view of television cameras. Similar anti-globalization protests occurred during 2000 in Bangkok, in Washington, DC, in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in Melbourne, Australia and in Prague, Czech Republic.

In 2001, despite the attempts by government leaders in the major industrial states to find ways to keep demonstrators away from major summit meetings, we witnessed major civil society demonstrations in Windsor, Ontario, Canada at the Summit of the Americas and in Genoa, Italy where a protester was killed and many injured. The lack of civil society's confidence in state governments and intergovernmental institutions was a sure sign that these top-down governance bodies were beginning to lose their legitimacy. These protests represented the clash between two worlds: a state-centric one and a multi-centric one.

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[30] Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003).

[31] This point is also made by Walden Bello, "2000: The Year of Global Protest against Globalization," *Canadian Dimension*, Vol. 35, no. 2 (2001), p.24.

[32] Ibid. p. 24.

Rosenau and Durfee note that "alongside the traditional world of states, a complex multi-centric world of diverse actors has emerged, replete with structures, processes, and decision rules of its own." These authors go on to label these two worlds in turn as 'state-centric' and 'multi-centric'. As these two sets of structures intersect, one should expect that multilateralism at that specific juncture would be different in character from the multilateralism that emerged out of the immediate post-World War II period. Certainly, the empirical evidence points to a changed socio-political environment within which multilateral institutions are forced to operate today. The global stage is "dense with actors, large and small, formal and informal, economic and social, political and cultural, national and transnational, international and subnational, aggressive and peaceful, liberal and authoritarian, who collectively form a highly complex system of global governance."[33]

The large number and vast range of collectivities that clamber onto the global stage exhibit both organized and disorganized complexity.[34] Literally, thousands of factions, associations, organizations, movements and interest groups, along with states, now form a network pattern of interactions, which reminds one of Burton's 'cobweb' metaphor.[35] The advent of this bifurcated system of governance does not mean that states are in the process of disintegration. The interstate system will continue to be central to world affairs for decades to come.

This proliferation of sovereignty-bound and sovereignty-free actors suggests that existing international governance systems have failed to deal adequately with the new transnational problems or with new actors' aspirations. It would seem as though international governance has been reflexively adapting to these challenges in two ways: grafting new elements and transforming itself. But certainly, the concept itself is undergoing change.

Governance can be distinguished from government in that the former is an umbrella concept while the latter constitutes the institutions and agents charged with governing. Government refers to "formal institutions that are part of hierarchical norm- and rule-making, monitoring of compliance rules, and rule

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[33] James N. Rosenau, "Governance in a New Global Order," p.225.

[34] James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, *Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), p.40.

[35] John W. Burton, *World Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

enforcement."[36] It is basically what governments do. Governments have the power to make binding decision and to enforce those decisions, and they have the authority to allocate values.[37] Indeed, at least over the past two decades, the term 'governance' has enjoyed a revival of sorts, linked to attempts by scholars to distinguish between 'governance' and 'government'.[38] And, since 1995, in particular, the term 'global governance' has become an integral part of the lexicon of scholars and practitioners globally, in large part because of the emergence of the academic journal, *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* and the widely distributed report of the Commission on Global Governance titled *Our Global Neighbourhood*.[39]

Why has there been a revival of the concept of governance of late? The answer seems to lie in the paradigmatic crises that occurred in the social sciences in the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to the systemic challenges referred to above. Bob Jessop once put it that the paradigmatic crises were "the possibility of culturally diverse alternatives to global homogenization and the capacity of paradigm in use to describe and explain the 'real world'.[40]

Finkelstein has written that political scientists have been "uncomfortable with traditional frameworks and terminologies associated with the idea of international relations in an interstate system" ever since the emergence of 'complex interdependence' and what James Rosenau aptly called "the crazy-quilt nature of modern interdependence."[41] It should not come as a surprise to learn that the use of the term 'global governance' has paralleled the advent of the intensification of globalization.

We are well aware of the fact that there is no world government at this juncture in our history. The reality is that no overarching government exists that can handle all facets of the globalization phenomenon. World Federalists are generally impatient with institutions like the UN system because it has not gone far enough in terms of its ability to control, steer, and address all levels of human

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[36] Bruhl and Rittberger, "From International to Global Governance," p.5.
[37] Gerry Stoker, "Governance as Theory: Five Propositions," *International Social Science Journal,* vol.50, no.55 (1998), pp.17-28.
[38] James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
[39] The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
[40] Bob Jessop, "The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure: The Case of Economic Development," p.31.
[41] Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "What is Global Governance?" *Global Governance*, vol. 1 (1995), p. 367.

activity that have transnational repercussions. But there is no denying the fact that while world government is not likely to emerge anytime soon, there are elements of global governance already in place and the activities of such governance can be found at many levels – global, trans-regional, regional, sub-regional, state, and local. The purpose of global governance is to steer and modify the behaviour of actors who operate on the global stage in such a manner that they will avoid deadly conflicts and reduce the level of intense socio-economic and political competition. In that sense, global governance implies a purposive activity, in the absence of world government that involves a range of actors besides states. Marie-Claude Smout describes this governance as "order plus intentionality."[42]

Global governance also refers to more than formal institutional processes. Informal networks and regimes can be involved in global governance. Indeed, the bulk of cross-border transactions these days are managed to a large extent by informal regimes (principles, norms, rules, practices and decision-making procedures). While national governments and the UN system are very much central to the activities of global governance, they only form part of the overall picture. The Commission on Global Governance defined this form of governance as "the sum of the many ways in which individuals and institutions, both public and private, manage their common affairs."[43] This definition is broad enough to allow for the participation of state and non-state actors in the schemes of global governance.

At the present time, neither the UN system nor any regional or transnational body can hope to perform all the tasks of global governance on their own. Thus the work of global governance requires the actions of a plurality of actors, and not just the actions of a collection of nation-states. This can include civil society movements, NGOs, MNCs, and even wealthy individuals. Some of these non-state actors are playing a pivotal role in governance at every level and "changing perceptions and behaviour in fields as diverse as international health, environmental management, peace and security, human rights, and trade."[44]

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[42] Marie-Claude Smouts, "The proper use of Governance in International Relations," International Social Science Journal, 155 (March 1998), p. 82.

[43] The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, p. 2.

[44] On this point see Shepard Foreman and Derek Segaar, "New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism," Centre on International Cooperation (New York, 2004), p. 1.

The concept of global governance, with the expanded contributing players, now has several layers of meaning and insinuated sub-texts. It implies that there is a measure of control, order, orderliness and manageability at its core. This is coupled with the implicit notion of functional administration. But added to that is another layer of intersubjective norms, principles and rules at play. There is also the implication that a global governance regime ought to be accountable and responsive to those it serves (i.e. not just state actors, but also non-state actors and populations at large). Connected to this notion is the expectation of transparency.

In reconceptualising global governance for the twenty-first century, one can adopt at least three separate meanings of the term: 1) the centralization of authority at the global level; 2) authority that is limited to specific situations, levels and issues; 3) the sum of all diverse efforts of communities at every level to achieve specific goals while preserving coherence from one moment in time to the next. It is the last of these three definitions that seems most applicable to the needs of this historical moment. This is global governance as a summative phenomenon. To quote Rosenau, global governance "is the summarizing phrase for all sites in the world where efforts to exercise authority is undertaken."[45] In this light, global governance has not replaced international governance; instead, both forms of governance operate alongside each other, sometimes complementing each other, sometimes clashing with each other.

Conclusion

Oran Young once remarked at the end of the last century that "The demands for governance in world affairs has never been greater." This explains the continued appeal of, growth in, and dependence on international organizations today. But as we entered into the new millennium, it was evident that the intergovernmental organization created at the end of WWII are no longer able to address successfully the myriad problems facing the globe. The massive ideological, socio-political, and economic changes that have occurred particularly since the end of the Cold War have put pressure on state-centric organizations to adjust to the post modern era.

State-centric and sovereignty-bound intergovernmental organizations like the UN system have tried to institute reforms and adjustments to their structures,

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[45] James N. Rosenau, "Governance in a new Global Order," p. 224.

processes and operations. But their efforts have been like changing the damaged wing of an airplane while it is still in flight. Major transformative changes that are required to those organizations are being put off because these organizations are saddled with trying to deal with so many complex problems that need to be addressed. Even though these organizations have expanded the range of their governance, proliferated in number, and increased the level of their influence, major question remain about their efficiency, effectiveness and relevance.

These questions have intensified as the seeming 'new world disorder' unfolded. We have now come to the realization that there is a need for a new conceptualization of global governance to match what is occurring on the ground. Even states have begun to realize that governing the globe requires the cooperation not only of fellow-state actors but also of non-state actors. In the past, state-centric IGOs have tended to "act as a conservative force against radical change by conforming to the status-quo and by further institutionalizing the present international framework."[46] But those days have passed. For humankind to survive on this planet, in this global neighbourhood, we need a network of governance institutions that includes multipurpose and limited purpose international governmental organizations but also embraces international non-governmental organizations, transnational corporate bodies, civil society organizations, and influential individuals.

This summative global governance architecture because of the character and nature of the new multilateralism. Anarchic governance is not possible in a world that is as interdependent as ours. Hierarchical (top down) governance served its purpose during the interwar and post-World War II period. However, both of these forms of governance have been challenged by new developing states as they shook off the chains of colonialism, by civil society groups demanding a place and a voice on the stage of global politics, and by hybrid public/private consortia which operate in a modified capitalist space. As the theory catches up with the praxis on the ground, the best description of the emerging and new form of global governance might be "heterarchic governance" – a type of governance that involves "self-organized steering of multiple agencies, institutions, and systems

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[46] A. Leroy Bennett and James K. Oliver, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues* 7th edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 449.

which are operationally autonomous from one another yet structurally coupled due to their mutual interdependence."[47]

As we search for a new paradigm for global governance it would be useful to embrace the critical school position on multilateralism and global governance. It is an approach that allows one to stand back from the tedious details of current events and offer a more holistic and panoramic view of the landscape of global changes to existing ides, material capabilities, and institutions. This reflectivist turn in the multilateral scholarship has pointed out at least five challenges to the Westphalian state system in which the traditional international organizations have operated in the past:

> 1) Emergence of bifurcated structures operating at the global level;
> 2) Increased complex interdependence assisted by the advent of dynamic communication and transportation technologies;
> 3) rapid globalization of economies which has taken economic and political decision-making power away from some states and thrust them in the hands of private actors like stock markets, banks, and bond-rating agencies;
> 4) Emergence and increased importance of transnational and intermestic issues with which individual states and IGOs cannot deal with acting on their own; and,
> 5) Gendering of governance institutions and processes that operate on the global level.

In effect, each of these challenges indicates a focus on dis-junctures and dis-continuities. Understanding the impact of such changes on existing structures and processes of multilateralism is important for the reconceptualization of global governance. The structural changes that we are now witnessing in the early part of the twenty-first century are producing a complex, multi-level pattern of forces that challenge us to discard the oversimplified state-centric vision of world order and to replace it with a modified vision of reality. At this juncture of transformation, the governance system for the globe is clearly a bifurcated one. The interstate system of governance is still with us. But we are observing the emergence of a multi-centric system of diverse types of collectivities. Combined, we can label this as summative global governance.

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[47] Bob Jessop, "The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure," p. 29.

This emerging system of global governance resembles a network that has links to multiple centres of authority at multiple levels (universal, continental, trans-regional, regional, trans-regional, sub-regional, national, sub-national/local. Some authors have referred to this as multilevel governance. It is the kind of governance that requires a subsidiarity principle to guide its operations. It is a kind of governance that is more sophisticated and flexible than previous forms and it may be able to provide the space and time for traditional intergovernmental institutions to make the needed transformation in order to become not only more efficient and effective, but also more relevant in the twenty-first century.