STUDY AND DISCUSSION GUIDE

for

TRANSFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM: DESIGNS FOR A WORKABLE WORLD

by

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This Study and Discussion Guide, published by The Workable World Trust, is a supplement to:


The Workable World Trust Mission Statement:

The Workable World Trust seeks to devise, promote and disseminate ideas conducive to the establishment of a “workable world,” a world in which:

- the rule of democratically established, binding law supplants the law of force;
- people, not states or monarchs, are recognized as the ultimate source of sovereignty;
- global problems lead to ecologically and economically sustainable global solutions;
- the good of the planet takes precedence over the good of individual nations;
- fundamental human rights are sacrosanct;
- despite inevitable imperfections in the system of governance, systemic flexibility will provide reason to hope for continuous progress and human betterment.

Agencies with Which the Trust Is Affiliated:

- World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy: associated organization (AO)
- Citizens for Global Solutions (national and Minnesota levels): close working relationship
- Minnesota Alliance of Peacemakers: one of several founding members
- World Government Research Network: member
- Center for United Nations Constitutional Research: co-founder
- Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly: steering committee member
DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to all persons who recognize that they are World Citizens and who, by word and deed, seek to promote universal justice.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We here acknowledge our deep gratitude to two long-time friends and colleagues, Drs. Michael M. Andregg and Ronald J. Glossop. Michael painstakingly edited each unit of this study guide and offered much perceptive and constructive criticism throughout. Ron also read the entire manuscript and provided us with valuable feedback.

JES and NJD

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Preface

Since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, there has been much talk about reforming its Charter and working methods, but remarkably little action in doing so. In fact, the UN Charter was designed to prevent reforms that would diminish the power of the leading victorious nations in World War II, the so-called P-5: China, France, the Soviet Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom and the United States. That arrangement has worked reasonably well for those powers. But repeated failures by the UN to deal effectively with such major global problems as weapons of mass destruction, genocide, mass migrations, climate change, and global pandemics have significantly strengthened the determination of enlightened world citizens to reform, or better yet, to transform, the present system.

But how? One problem is that most reform proposals are general declarations of what is needed with few specifics regarding the details and workability of the reforms in question. In contrast to such proposals, Transforming the United Nations System: Designs for a Workable World, published by the United Nations University Press, provides well-informed and logically reasoned specifics in regard to scores of reform proposals.

This book is not light reading. Many otherwise well-educated readers know little about how the UN works, or why, all too often, it fails to work. Few, however, will regard the UN in the same light after finishing the book as they did before they began. More than a few will feel motivated to do what they can to promote specific reform proposals or even wholesale transformation of the UN system. Our hope is that the book and our accompanying Guide – soon to become available in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, German, Japanese, Russian and Spanish - will facilitate worldwide discussion on the important reform proposals contained herein.

This Guide is not to be regarded as a substitute for the book itself, which is much more nuanced and complete. But it will enable the reader to focus more rewardingly on the book’s key ideas and on the proposals in the text. We recommend that readers read specific chapters in the book, one or two at a time, and only afterward consult this Guide. Readers may also wish to note their thoughts in a journal or, better yet, participate in a book discussion group to facilitate deeper study.

The initial English edition of the book was published in 2013. Since then, in our rapidly changing world, many troublesome global issues have gained in salience. We believe, however, that none of the changes is of such a nature as to invalidate any of the arguments put forward. On the contrary, they impart greater urgency for creative action.

Yours for a more workable world.
Joseph E. Schwartzberg and Nancy J. Dunlavy
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication .................................................................................................................. iii  
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... iii  
The Authors ................................................................................................................... iii  
Preface ........................................................................................................................... iv  
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... v  
Unit 1: Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1  
  “Rethinking Sovereignty” ............................................................................................ 5  
Unit 2: Reform of the General Assembly ................................................................. 7  
Unit 3: A World Parliamentary Assembly .................................................................. 10  
Unit 4: Reform of the Security Council ...................................................................... 13  
Unit 5: From ECOSOC to ESEC ................................................................................. 17  
Unit 6: A Credible Human Rights System ............................................................... 20  
Unit 7: A Strengthened Judicial System ..................................................................... 23  
Unit 8: Coordination of UN Specialized Agencies and Special UN  
  Commissions and Funds ............................................................................................ 26  
Unit 9: Enhancing Human Resources ....................................................................... 29  
Unit 10: Engaging Civil Society: NGOs and Other Non-State Actors .................... 32  
Unit 11: The Problem of Funding .............................................................................. 35  
Unit 12: Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Disarmament ........................................ 39  
  “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) .................................................................. 47  
Unit 13: Towards a Sustainable Planet and an Expanded Common  
  Heritage .................................................................................................................... 49  
Unit 14: A New Global Governance Architecture .................................................. 53  
Unit 15: Getting There ............................................................................................... 58  
  Concluding Thoughts ................................................................................................. 62  
Supplementary Resources ............................................................................................ 63
Fundamental Principles (p. xxviii-xxix)

RULE OF LAW
The force of just law must supplant the law of force.

GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE
Our planet is an interdependent organism. What nations do on their own territory often affects other nations seriously, either for better or for worse. Nature respects no boundaries.

GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
Global problems require global solutions.

IMPLICATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
National sovereignty implies not only national rights, but also national responsibilities. The meaning of sovereignty is much debated and has changed over time. On p. 239, you will find an excellent statement by former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. See also the discussion on “Rethinking Sovereignty” at the end of this Unit.

HUMAN RIGHTS
All humans are entitled to political, civil, economic and social rights, as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
When nations fail to protect the rights of their citizens, the international community has the responsibility to do so.

QUESTIONS:

1. Discuss the meaning of each of these six principles. For each, do you agree or disagree? Why do you believe as you do?

2. Are any of these principles potentially dangerous? Why?
Our Changing World *(p. xxix-xxx)*

Since the UN’s founding in 1945, we have seen:

1. a great rise in the number and importance of international and regional agencies;
2. economic and social globalization, with much greater roles for non-state actors, especially MNCs (multi-national corporations) and NGOs (non-governmental organizations);
3. the subversion of local cultures;
4. new voices, especially among youth, demanding political, economic and social justice, and widespread terrorism when those voices are ignored;
5. a revolution in communication technology, enabling the virtually instant spread of new ideas and information to all parts of the world.

*Note:* We have purposely kept the above list of changes short here, not mentioning climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other important processes that do not bear directly on the architecture of global governance.

**QUESTIONS:**

1. *What are the implications of the changes noted above?*
2. *What are the downsides of those changes?*
3. *How can we guard against harmful “unintended consequences”?*
4. *What other major changes demand our attention?*
5. *Can nations by themselves cope adequately with the pace of change? If not, why not?*

Choices for the Rich (the “Global North”) *(p. xxx)*

Here are a few possibilities:

Option A: Isolationism coupled with nationalism, looking only after one’s own national interests and relying on military might to keep potential enemies at bay.
Option B: Patronage of poor nations, allocating a small portion of one’s resources to meeting the world’s needs (enough to maintain others as dependent clients, but not enough to bring about major changes), co-opting and supporting national elites.

Option C: Globalism, working for needed changes in our system of global governance to promote democracy and justice.

**Choices for the Poor (the “Global South”)** *(p. xxx)*

*Here are a few possibilities:*

Option A: Fatalistically accepting the continuation of global injustice and adopting policies acceptable to the powerful.

Option B: Violently demanding justice (with the consequent likelihood of being crushed).

Option C: Globalism, working for needed changes in our system of global governance to promote democracy and justice.

**QUESTIONS:**

1. *What kind of world will we pass on to our children if rich and/or poor nations fail to choose option C above?*

2. *Rather than waiting for World War III or some other global catastrophe to persuade us to institute major changes in our system of governance, how can we now marshal the necessary will to generate the momentum to do so?*

**Utopia or “Workability?”** *(p. 3)*

A perfect world is not attainable, but a “workable world” is. The book puts forward scores of detailed proposals for improving global governance through peaceful, evolutionary processes. The aim is not to create an unrealistic “utopia,” but rather - to the extent practicable - to establish a world in which the force of law supplants the law of force, a world committed to justice and continuous, yet sustainable, development.
QUESTIONS:
1. What, in your opinion, are the minimum set of goals to be achieved to make our world “workable?” Will reaching the UN’s “Sustainable Development Goals” suffice? If not, what additional goals must be met?

2. If you could bring about just one change in our present system of global governance, what would that change be? What if you could make two major changes? Or even three? (The book offers dozens of possibilities.)

3. How would we decide on the optimal sequencing of needed reforms? Is there some obviously logical plan that we should follow? Or should we just react to new challenges as they arise?

Questions of Design and Perspective (p. 2, 5-8)

One of the key ideas in the book is that the design of decision-making agencies contributes greatly to the quality and legitimacy of the decisions that they make. But, to put it mildly, there are many major problems with the way in which the UN was cobbled together by the great powers in 1945 and in the ways by which new global agencies have been added ever since. Throughout the UN system the principal units of decision-making are individual nations. But these vary enormously in population (see figure 1.1 of book), wealth, culture and political orientation, more so than within any individual nation. At the founding of the UN, the dominant perspective of the Charter was that of the powerful nations of the Western world (now seen as the “Global North”), but most members of the UN, by far, are nations of the “Global South.”

QUESTIONS:
1. Are the differences among members of the UN so great that it is unrealistic to try to find ways by which they can work together fairly and efficiently? Or should we scrap the entire system and begin again from the ground up? Why do you believe as you do?

2. Decisions – non-binding, except for those of the Security Council – are presently made on the basis of “one-nation-one-vote” irrespective of the differences in the power of the nations. Could some sort of weighted voting system(s) be devised to deal with this problem? How do you think this might work?
Rethinking Sovereignty

Despite the fact that the issues treated in the following discussion are accorded little space in the author’s original work, they merit substantial thought and discussion to enable readers to better understand the context for other discussions throughout this Study Guide.

Article 2 of the UN Charter states: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” Steadfast adherence to this principle, especially by nations that are politically weak, has proved to be a major impediment to Charter reform. But is this seemingly simple principle, originating with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia -- following Europe’s devastating Thirty Years War and subsequently diffused by colonial powers throughout the world -- still optimal for our complex and interdependent planet? Our answer is certainly “no.”

In fact, the meaning of sovereignty has been and remains the subject of heated debate. Who, for example, should be the legitimate holders of sovereignty? In the 17th century, it was generally believed that monarchs (“sovereigns”) ruled absolutely and by divine right. The American and French Revolutions, however, promoted the view that sovereignty belongs to the people and that all citizens were equal and entitled to equal rights. Of course, this lofty view differed – and still differs – from the current political reality. As a practical matter, the ability to exercise sovereignty (i.e., to govern) in most nations claiming to be democratic republics is constitutionally delegated to legislators – some appointed and some elected – who may or may not exercise their powers freely.

In most of the world’s nations, sovereignty is held exclusively by the central government, even though local governments may be granted the revocable power to legislate on many matters. But in twenty nations, those with federal constitutions, sovereignty is irrevocably divided between the central government and the nation’s constituent territorial units (states, provinces, cantons, etc.), each exercising constitutionally delegated power to legislate in regard to specified issues (foreign affairs, international trade, education, health, etc.). Many of the world’s most powerful, populous, largest and/or diverse nations are federations: the USA, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria, Germany, Russia, India, Pakistan, Australia, etc. So, too, are several highly successful, but small, states, such as Switzerland. In total, federations account for 37% of the world’s population, 46% of its GNI and 52% of its land area.

Whatever a nation’s type of government may be – on a spectrum ranging from truly democratic to autocratic – the Westphalian system of
sovereignty conveys to that nation the right to govern exclusively over a specifically bounded area. Attempts by outside agencies, including those of the United Nations system, to legally abridge this right (among others) are almost always considered unacceptable. Nations zealously seek to preserve their unfettered sovereignty. While the Westphalian system, at times, worked more or less well, present-day threats to global security and sustainability make it necessary for us to reconsider adherence to the idea of unfettered national sovereignty in the contemporary world.

Although the Westphalian system theoretically empowers nations to control the flow of people, goods, services, money and ideas across their borders, in practice they do so rather poorly. Ways are almost always found to enable laundered money, migrants, black market merchandise, drugs, sex trafficking, propaganda, armaments, and other “bads” to evade government regulations. Additionally, behind-the-curtain influence peddling often enables agents of foreign governments and powerful and unscrupulous multi-national companies to influence national policies in profoundly undesirable ways.

QUESTIONS:

1. Why do nations adhere so tenaciously to the outmoded Westphalian model of sovereignty?

2. Do you believe that the UN should have the power to enact binding legislation in regard to a select group of issues? If so, what should those subjects be and why? How and under what circumstances might the list of subjects be expanded? (This topic will be explored in Units 2 and 3.)

3. Should sovereign nations be subject to international jurisdiction and the imposition of punitive sanctions when activities within their borders (e.g., pollution of the atmosphere and groundwater) have serious adverse effects on other countries? If you answered yes, what might those sanctions be? (This topic will be discussed in Units 7 and 12.)

4. Could the federal model of shared sovereignty within nations such as the United States or India be applied at the global level, with a constitutional division of legislative and other governmental powers between a central world government and the governments of individual nations? (While the book does not discuss this question, it is one that all the world’s citizens should be thinking about.)
Unit 2: Reform of the General Assembly (p. 13-35)

Why Is This Important (p. 13-15)

The General Assembly (GA) is the UN’s main deliberative body. Its membership, now 193 nations (originally 51), is virtually universal, accounting for 99.6% of humanity. Each member nation has one vote. Despite its universality, the allocation of power in the GA fails to reflect the distribution of power in the world outside the UN itself. Many GA resolutions are mere exercises in political posturing. They are non-binding, accorded little respect and routinely flouted. A more rational, realistic, decision-making system is urgently needed.

Key Issues (p. 15-20)

As GA membership expanded, its political orientation changed. Its early years were marked by the opposition of Eastern and Western blocs; but decolonization, mainly in the 1960s, led to more frequent confrontation between the economically powerful North and the numerically preponderant, more populous and politically weak South. The initial dominance of the United States and its allies steadily declined. The bloc of developing countries known as the G-77 (now 131 nations) can now marshal the two-thirds voting majority needed to win votes on a wide range of issues. But the veto power exercised by any one or more of the five leading powers (P-5) on the Security Council often nullifies the GA’s non-binding decisions. On issues deemed important to them, powerful nations frequently resort to questionable tactics: bribery, threats, economic sanctions and so forth to influence the votes of the economically weak.

Possible Solutions (p. 21-33)

1. Implementing an effective system of weighted voting based on principles that are reasonably fair and politically acceptable. (p. 21-25)

   Needed conditions:
   - based on clear and valid principles
   - relatively simple
   - objectively determined
   - applied equally to all members
flexible (responding automatically to demographic, economic and political changes)

nuanced

realistic (having a meaningful relationship to the distribution of power outside the UN arena)

Basic principles, each with equal weight, to be included in a weighted voting formula:

- democratic/demographic (i.e., population)
- economic capacity to be effective, (based on contributions to the UN budget) (allocated in direct proportion to Gross National Income [GNI]; discussed in detail in Chapter 11).
- legal/sovereign equality of nations, all nations being counted equally.

QUESTIONS:

1. Do you agree that weighted voting based on a simple mathematical formula will yield a fairer and better distribution of power than the present one-nation-one-vote system? If so, why? If not, why not?

2. Are the weighted voting conditions noted above both necessary and sufficient for their intended purpose? If not, what would you add or eliminate?

3. Why do you suppose the three basic principles noted above were assigned equal weight? In particular, how do you view the “sovereign equality of nations?”

4. If you objected to the three considerations in the recommended formula having equal weight, would a provision for periodic reconsideration of the weights take care of your concerns?

5. Should other measurable factors also be considered? If so, what would you recommend?

2. Endowing the GA with a limited capacity to pass legally binding resolutions, rather than restricting it solely to a recommendatory role. (p. 26-33)

The GA’s role would be limited to important matters of global or international concern. Passage of relevant resolutions would require approval by nations with a combined voting weight of at least two-thirds of those present and voting and with a combined population of at
least half of all nations present and voting. On some issues (e.g., authorizing peacekeeping operations) larger super-majorities might be required.

QUESTIONS:

1. Why is the ability to pass binding resolutions important? How would it affect national sovereignty?

2. Can a resolution be truly “binding” if the UN has no effective enforcement capability?

3. Although implementing the recommendations in this chapter would result in increased UN dues for virtually all UN members, there would also be significant economic rewards. What might those rewards be?

4. What other benefits might member nations and the world as a whole derive from the proposed changes?

5. How can UN member nations, each with its own vested interests and short-range worldview, be persuaded to support the proposed changes? (This will be further discussed in Unit 15).

United Nations headquarters buildings in mid-town New York
Why Is This Important? (p. 36)

The opening words of the UN Charter are “We the peoples,” but nowhere else in the Charter is the role of the people(s), as opposed to that of governments, mentioned. This conventional view that people are represented via their respective national governments is often invalid. In practice, the “democratic deficit” has been profound.

Key Issues (p. 36-38, 59, 61)

Presently, the UN lacks a true legislative organ. The General Assembly may be regarded as a proto-legislature. It has deliberative and advisory capability, but it cannot enact binding legislation. It represents nation states, rather than people. If the GA were to become one house of a bicameral body, whose second house, a World Parliamentary Assembly (WPA), representing people -- analogous to the US Senate and House of Representatives, respectively -- the resultant creation would enable the UN to provide voices for those whose lives are impacted by its decisions. A WPA, Boutros Boutros-Ghali observed, "could invigorate our institutions of global governance with unprecedented legitimacy, transparency and accountability."

With a WPA and other reforms in place, we could expect a world in which people of different nations would be more inclined to listen to and learn from one another, in which states would be less prone to violent conflict, and in which a revitalized UN would be better able to address the needs of all the Earth’s inhabitants.

OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME:
- The large number of member states from which representatives would have to be elected
- The exceedingly skewed distribution of their population and economic capability
- The exceedingly large number of constituents that would be represented by individual parliamentarians
- The diversity of their languages and cultures
- The wide variation among nations in respect to their past experience and current practices relating to democratic governance
Obtaining agreement within the UN that a WPA is necessary is unlikely to come about without substantial and persistent pressure by civil society on the governments of progressive member nations. Those nations, in turn, would have to take the lead in promoting the WPA idea within the GA, whose assent by a 2/3 majority would be essential. (Note that Security Council approval would not be needed – p. 38)

**QUESTIONS:**

1. *Is criticism of the democratic deficit in the UN system justified? Why do you hold your opinion, pro or con? If the latter, do you agree that a WPA could be effective in resolving this deficit?*

2. *Could a WPA give minorities, including indigenous peoples, a voice at the UN? If so, how?*

3. *How might a WPA impact transparency, effectiveness, and legitimacy within the UN system?*

4. *What concerns might block or stall the creation of a WPA? Would the creation of a WPA threaten national sovereignty?*

5. *If universal membership is envisioned, what influence would non-democratic states have? Should participation be restricted to delegates from democratic nations? What are the arguments, pro and con?*

6. *How long might it take to persuade a 2/3 majority in the GA that a WPA would be beneficial? What actions can civil society organizations and progressive member nations take to move this idea forward?*

**Possible Solutions (p. 38-59)**

The book proposes the following evolutionary approach:

**Stage 1 (p. 38-45): An advisory body with parliamentarians (MWPs) chosen by national governments**

Such a body would be a politically expedient, near-term solution, biased in favor of both demographically small states and major donor nations. The number of seats advocated for each country would be determined based on population, UN dues paid (in proportion to GNI) and the “sovereign equality of nations” principle. UN members with more than one seat would be expected to assign seats with due regard to the breakdown by parties within their legislatures. The WPA at this Stage would be endowed with only advisory and consultative powers.
Stage 2 (p. 45-58): A popularly elected body with gradually increasing legislative competence

We propose a system of “degressive proportionality” to determine the number of seats per nation. In such a system the number of constituents per legislator increases as a nation’s population increases.

Stage 3 (p. 58-61): a maximally democratic system (one-person-one-vote), in which country boundaries are often ignored and the number of constituents per MWP is roughly equal everywhere

The entire world would be divided into a set of “electoral fields,” each with four to ten popularly elected seats filled in accordance with some agreed-upon system of proportional representation. Some of these fields would consist of portions of given nations, others would comprise a single nation and some would combine a number of small neighboring nations.

QUESTIONS:

1. If you question the desirability and feasibility of the book’s evolutionary approach to creating a WPA, with three stages of development, what is your suggested alternative and why do you believe it would be preferable?

2. STAGE 1: To what extent would you regard representation by members of national parliaments, or by individuals appointed by national governments, a desirable development?

3. STAGE 1: How much power should be granted to a WPA in the initial stage of its existence? Should it be authorized to enact binding legislation? Or should it play only an advisory role? Why do you hold the opinion that you do?

4. STAGE 2: Why do you / don’t you accept the idea of “degressive proportionality” (p. 49-54)? Why do you / don’t you accept the idea of “proportional representation” (p. 54-56) for political parties within the delegations of nations with more than a single seat?

5. STAGE 2: What would be required to enhance the WPA’s democratic credentials to such an extent that it would be given a role, along with the GA, in drafting and enacting binding legislation?

6. STAGE 3: Do you believe that the proposed multi-seat electoral fields are a desirable and achievable goal?
The Security Council (SC) is the most keenly scrutinized UN agency. In contrast to the GA, its decisions are, in principle, legally binding. But, because of the lack of a standing enforcement mechanism, the Council's decisions are often flouted. This brings the system as a whole into disrepute. Further, the unfair advantages enjoyed by the P-5 powers -- permanent Council membership and the power of the veto -- create a double standard in accountability and leads to widespread resentment among other nations. The Council has, however, been instrumental in averting World War III and in stemming or preventing numerous regional conflicts. Appropriately transformed, it could be a major guarantor of peace.

**Key Issues** (p. 64-73)

**Decreasing representativeness and legitimacy**

- The SC originally consisted of eleven members -- five permanent members (the P-5: China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the US) plus six members elected for two-year, non-renewable terms. The SC thus represented more than a fifth of the original 51 UN members, and three-fifths of their total population. As new members joined the United Nations, the representativeness of the SC’s membership declined substantially
  - The share of the P-5 in the UN’s total population, of both the UN’s members and of the world as a whole, declined substantially (from 63% to 28% and from 39% to 28% respectively), with no commensurate diminution in the P-5’s institutional power.
  - Today’s SC consists of the P-5 members plus ten additional non-permanent members. These 15 members represent less than 8% of the total membership.

- Non-permanent SC members are selected with due regard to “equitable geographical distribution.” But, regardless of their regional origin, they are fundamentally guided by their perception of their own *national* interest.
- The selection process is highly politicized with insufficient consideration for merit.
The votes of very small nations with non-permanent seats (e.g., Malta) count equally with those of demographic giants (e.g., India), with no relation to their weight in the world beyond the UN.

Problems with the P-5 veto power:
- The special status accorded to the P-5 flies in the face of contemporary power realities. Germany and Japan have surpassed France, the United Kingdom and Russia in economic power, and India and Brazil are expected to do so shortly.
- The veto power accorded to the P-5 members effectively immunizes them from meaningful UN censure for acts detrimental to others in the global community or for egregious offences within their own borders. This double standard diminishes the UN’s moral legitimacy and is increasingly questioned by non P-5 nations.

Weaknesses of Other Reform Proposals
The SC has been the object of more recommendations for reform than any other UN entity. Yet the scores of proposals fail to address adequately the SC’s core weaknesses. They shortsightedly focus on 1) how many new seats should be added, 2) whether other nations merit permanent seats, and, 3) if so, with what level of veto power, if any. They fail to critique the anachronistic regional division of the world for purposes of choosing non-permanent members, and they fail to propose an end to the veto.

QUESTIONS:
1. Why might a Security Council with fewer than 15 seats be more efficient than a Security Council with 15 or more seats?
2. Why is a maximally representative SC a worthwhile goal?
3. Are there any valid arguments for retaining the special privileges of the P-5?

Possible Solutions (p. 73-90)
1. A universally representative SC with 12 regional seats, each carrying a mathematically determined weighted vote (p. 73-89)
   - Regions should have a population, territorial extent and/or degree of economic importance such that the legitimacy of their representation in the SC will not be seriously questioned.
   - Up to four of the regions could consist of a single powerful nation, based on a proposed formula (discussed below).
To the extent practicable, the remainder would be assemblages of more or less similar, but not necessarily contiguous, states. The ensemble of regions should be created to maximize internal regional homogeneity with regard to factors such as culture, religion, language, economic interests and shared historical experience. Each multinational region would nominate a slate of 2-5 candidates, and from each slate SC representatives would be elected by the GA.

- Each region would devise its own set of decision-making rules by which its representatives would be guided.
- Although the GA would specify the initial composition of multinational regions, individual nations would subsequently be allowed to transfer from one region to another. Nations could also be from parts of two regions, with their weight in decision-making divided equally between the two, so that their overall contribution to SC decisions would be the same as if it were only in one region.
- Weighted regional votes would be calculated by a formula based on population, paid UN contributions and a constant (8.33%) signifying that the global perspective of each of the 12 regions is equally worthy of respect.

The book notes (p. 77-78) that, based on current global conditions, three nations would qualify as single-nation regions: the United States, China and India. It also demonstrates (Table 4.1) that the formula leads to weighted voting results that reasonably reflect current real-world disparities in power and capability from one region to the next. Additionally the formula yields a reasonable balance between the global North (five regions with a combined weight of 45.3%) and the global South (seven regions with a combined weight of 54.7%).

**QUESTIONS:**


2. *Review pages 78-84, discussing the impact of this proposed regionally-based weighted-voting system on each region. Which regions would view this proposal favorably? Which are more likely to oppose it?*

3. *What are the merits of allowing individual nations to form parts of two regions (e.g., the UK as part of both Europe and Westminster League)?*
2. **Eliminating the Veto:** The anachronistic, morally indefensible veto power should be abolished. Although an overwhelming majority of UN member nations would support such a reform, the P-5 powers would resist. We suggest possible scenarios for implementation, either in one bold act or in phases.
   - Enhanced voting weights for the P-5 in a reformed and more empowered GA could be a workable trade-off for the loss of veto power in the SC.
   - Weighted voting in both the GA and the SC would enhance the legitimacy of UN decisions, thereby contributing substantially to the promotion of a more lawful, just and orderly world.
   - During a transitional period, one might gradually increase the number of P-5 nations whose dissenting votes would be required to block SC resolutions, while narrowing the range of subjects to which the veto might apply.

**QUESTIONS:**

1. *What arguments do the P-5 and some other nations offer in defense of retaining the veto?*

2. *Do you agree or disagree that eliminating the veto is actually possible? If so, why? If not, why not?*
Why Is This Important? (p. 94-95)

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is one of the core agencies provided for in the UN’s Charter. Though one might suppose that it would play a major role in ameliorating the human condition, especially in the global South, it functions inefficiently and its achievements have been modest. Much of its nominal mandate has been taken over by the UNGA to which it is functionally subordinate. Arguably ECOSOC’s principal role today is to provide the portal through which international non-governmental agencies (INGOs) are accredited to the UN system.

When the UN was created after World War II, peace was the prime imperative and environmental issues were not pressing. Today, global warming, desertification, deforestation, and species extinctions are major concerns. The economic and social conditions of our planet are greatly impacted by major environmental changes.

A reconstituted Economic, Social and Environmental Council (ESEC) could become a major agency for creative change.

Key Issues (p. 95-100)

**Functional Inadequacies:**
- ECOSOC’s work is mainly carried out by an elaborate, but confusing, array of committees, panels, working groups, etc., whose overlapping functions are not well matched to contemporary global problems.
- The environment is not considered part of ECOSOC’s mandate, and no part of ECOSOC deals specifically with these issues.
- Coordination between ECOSOC and the many other specialized UN agencies dealing with the same issues is tenuous at best.
- Many of the mandated functions of ECOSOC are more fully dealt with by the GA. ECOSOC functions increasingly in the shadow of the GA, and it has settled largely into the role of a conduit of information rather than an initiator or proactive coordinator of any meaningful action.
- ECOSOC is often bypassed by major powers, who generally prefer working with the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc.), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the G-6, G-7, G-8 and G-20 (in that order of formation) on matters of major importance.
The fact that ECOSOC meets in plenary session for only two brief periods per year totaling about 40 days reduces its effectiveness.

Questionable representativeness and legitimacy: Despite its relative unimportance in comparison to the SC and GA, ECOSOC is the only UN agency to have been the subject of two Charter reforms, ostensibly aimed at making its membership more representative. The first (in 1966) raised its membership from 18 to 27 and the second (in 1972) to 54. As with the SC, membership is apportioned among five regional caucuses, with 6 to 14 members per region, based on the number of nations therein rather than on population or global power. The pattern of membership over time is bizarre and biased in favor of small states. As in other UN bodies, individual member states prioritize their own needs over those of their region, not to mention those of the world as a whole.

Possible Solutions (p. 101-107)

1. **A universally representative ECOSOC/ESEC**
   - As with the SC, regions should have a population, territorial extent and/or degree of economic importance such that the legitimacy of their representation in ECOSOC/ESEC will not be seriously questioned. Twelve regions are suggested.
   - The sixty (or so) seats should be regionally apportioned according to a mathematical formula.
   - A group of relatively important UN member nations – based on a weighting formula, taking into consideration population and contributions to the UN budget -- would have individual seats with weighted votes.
   - Within each region, the remaining seats would be filled by a method similar to that recommended for multi-national regions in the Security Council, with a slate of nominees put forward by the region and elections by the GA; these seats would all have equal votes.
   - The regional allocation of seats and the determination of voting weights would be periodically readjusted in light of changes in population, UN assessments (based on GNI) and the political map.

2. **Functional Issues**
   - To minimize systemic redundancy, a reformed ESEC should be given enhanced responsibility with respect to economic, social and environmental matters, and new lines of authority between it and the GA (as well as with the WPA if such a body is created) should be established.
• ECOSOC/ESEC would remain in session for much longer terms than at present.
• Each regional caucus would formulate its own rules of procedure and guidelines for instructing regional representatives.
• Regional assemblies to discuss issues of global importance coming before ESEC would have the merit of facilitating discussion of essentially regional issues and should thereby promote regional integration.

**QUESTIONS:**

1. **Why are a maximally representative ECOSOC and weighted regional representation worthwhile goals?**

2. **Affluent nations currently tend to bypass ECOSOC due to its many weaknesses, including the unrealistic one-nation-one-vote system (p. 97). They work instead through the Bretton Woods institutions, OECD, G-20, etc. The global influence of these outside agencies has steadily increased -- despite criticism about their lack of transparency, inadequate input from the global South, and closed membership -- thus undermining the authority of the UN. What is your opinion of Bretton Woods institutions, OECD, G-20? Would the book’s proposed ESEC help it regain significant global influence in economic matters? Why or why not?**

3. **How much power should ESEC have in comparison to the GA? Why?**

4. **Our proposals for choosing representatives to ESEC and allocating voting weights are admittedly complicated. Can you think of ways of simplifying the system that will yield a reasonably fair and workable distribution of power? What would they be?**

5. **(p. 106): The proposed system, we believe, would contribute to regional and global integration, lead to a high degree of transparency, enhance the ability of weak nations to stand up collectively to inappropriate political pressures from major powers, and puts forward reasoned cases for greater global equity. Are these important objectives? Do you agree that the proposed system would lead to these results?**
Unit 6: A Credible Human Rights System  
(p. 110-128)

Why Is This Important?  
(p. 110-112)

The American and French Revolutions of the late 18\textsuperscript{th} century set in motion an inexorable process of expansion of human rights. Promotion of human rights was among the original concerns of the UN Charter; and, since its inception, the UN has made enormous strides in advancing the cause of human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), unanimously adopted in 1948, is one of civilization’s greatest aspirational documents, and it provided a path to the adoption of other human rights covenants and treaties. The International Criminal Court and various \textit{ad hoc} tribunals were created to deal with perpetrators of genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Human rights commissions and ombudspersons were instituted in many nations. And a multitude of human rights NGOs have been established, many of which have been granted consultative status with the UN. Thus, one may now speak of the existence of a complex global human rights system.

However, this “system” is rudimentary and seriously flawed. In dealing with egregious breaches of human rights, UN performance has often been inadequate. Significant reforms are needed. An enhanced and empowered human rights system is imperative for the future of human civilization.

Key Issues  
(p. 112-117)

1. Although “human rights” are widely regarded as being universal and indivisible, understandings of what is meant by “human rights” vary profoundly. This is demonstrated by two covenants (see p.112). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was promoted mainly by Western democracies and focused on individual rights. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was promoted by the Soviet-led bloc and most of the recently decolonized states in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean and Pacific regions and focused on non-measurable governmental behavior.

2. The proliferation of the human rights bureaucracy has resulted in numerous inefficiencies and substantial waste while failing to stop genocides like the one in Rwanda and major rights violations by many governments.
3. Politically-motivated appointments have allowed inadequate enforcement of standards, a high degree of politicization and frequent arbitrariness of the decision-making process. Hypocrisy is common.

4. Monitoring human rights by individual countries has been neither uniform, comprehensive nor systematic. Periodic reviews, initiated in 2006, have been excessively lenient, bestowing praise on states when little was merited.

5. States have sought membership on the Human Rights Council not to strengthen human rights but to immunize themselves from criticism.

**Possible Solutions (p. 117-125)**

Human rights decisions should be based on established principles rather than parochial political considerations. Moral influence should flow from the conformity of one’s arguments to the spirit and letter of the law and the appeal of those arguments to our shared humanity. The following are recommended:

1. A strengthened Human Rights Council (HRC), which could:
   a. elevate the HRC from its present subordinate position under the GA to that of a principal organ of the UN;
   b. elect HRC members as individuals on the basis of their qualifications (*personal integrity, human rights law expertise, and experience in dealing with human rights issues*);
   c. ensure that the perspectives of all major regions and faith traditions are represented;
   d. mandate a more equitable gender balance in HRC membership (*since offences against women are, arguably, the most pervasive of all human rights abuses, the perspective of females seems especially important*);
   e. provide voices for indigenous peoples;
   f. guarantee political immunity and asylum to delegates for actions taken in the performance of their duties

2. The number of HRC members should be large enough to ensure representation by all major state and regional actors, yet small enough to be efficient. Our book recommends 36 seats, chosen as follows:
   - 1 male and 1 female for each of the 12 regions
   - 1 male and 1 female to represent indigenous peoples
   - Ten seats elected at-large from the 9 multinational regions *(while it is politically desirable to have all regions represented, there are large differences in concern for human rights from one region to*
another. Electing a substantial proportion of seats from a slate of at-large candidates appears warranted.)

3. A more prominent role for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, with allocation of greater fiscal and personnel resources
4. Enhanced human rights monitoring
5. More regular and more detailed reporting on human rights by regional organizations, individual nations and NGOs
6. Greater use of legal systems (see Unit 7) to adjudicate human rights disputes
7. Increased resort to UN-mandated sanctions against egregious violators of human rights law
8. In extreme situations and, as a last resort, application of the use of force in keeping with the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) principle. (R2P will be covered in more detail in Unit 12).

QUESTIONS:

1. Some of the most egregious human rights offenders have served multiple terms on the Human Rights Council, thereby protecting themselves from serious scrutiny. A reformed Council, as our book proposes, would allow all nations, regardless of their human rights record, to be represented on the Council (most by region). Does the book’s proposal provide the needed checks and balances to correct for this systemic weakness? Might some countries with poor human rights records improve as a result of their participation on the Council? If so, how?

2. Do you agree that the HRC should be gender-balanced and have two seats designated for representatives of indigenous peoples? Does the reasoning for having ten “at-large” seats make sense to you? Should other specified populations be represented?
Unit 7: A Strengthened Judicial System  
(p. 129-148)

Why Is This Important?  
(p. 129-130)

Every orderly society depends on: a) law, to define minimum standards of behavior; b) courts, to peacefully settle disputes involving legal matters; and c) an effective system of law enforcement. Laws and their enforcement are dealt with in Units 6 and 12 respectively; here we focus on courts, an as yet under-developed link between the two at the global level.

Modest Beginnings  
(p. 130-143)

Not until 1907, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration was established in The Hague, was there any judicial body capable of settling international legal disputes. That still functioning body, however, was not a true court but rather a group of arbitrators available, as needed, to mediate or arbitrate disputes (mostly relatively minor) between two willing States. A more effective Permanent Court of International Justice was also established in The Hague in 1921, but it lacked compulsory jurisdiction and enforcement capability, and arguably it was never successful in averting a war or establishing the basis for a lasting peace among rival states. Its successor, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), established in 1945 as a key agency in the United Nations system, suffered from the same defects. However, its membership is virtually universal since being a member of the UN makes a nation, ipso facto, a member of the ICJ. The ICJ is also noteworthy for including justices from all of the world’s major cultures and judicial systems and, belatedly, a number of female justices. In addition to rendering theoretically binding, but often flouted, verdicts in “contentious” cases, the ICJ may convey “advisory opinions.” The latter carry substantial moral, if not legally binding, force.

In addition to the ICJ, the post-World War II period witnessed the birth of other internationally constituted judicial institutions. Of particular importance was the establishment in 2002 of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Its Statute has 124 adhering nations (as of 2016). Headquartered in The Hague and independent of the UN, the ICC is the first standing court to make the actions of individuals subject to criminal prosecution, thereby instituting a new global norm that no person, no matter how high in rank, should be above the law. But, despite this path-
breaking change, the ICC works very slowly. It has issued only 39 indictments, and only four convictions have been imposed as of this writing. Moreover, it has been criticized for an obvious double standard focusing almost exclusively on crimes committed in Africa and ignoring the alleged crimes of leaders from the global North. Neither the US, nor Russia, nor China are members. Thus (as of 2016) three African nations (including South Africa) have declared their intention to renounce their adherence to the ICC statute.

Globalization has expanded the need to regulate economic and other transnational activities, and it has led to the creation of hundreds of global and regional specialized agencies. The most prominent of these is the World Trade Organization (WTO) with 164 member nations as of 2016. Founded in 1995 – outside the UN system – it is adhered to by nations accounting for the vast majority of the world’s production and commerce. The WTO’s principal mandate, the liberalization of international trade, inevitably results in numerous legal disputes. To resolve these disputes evidence is secretly reviewed by appointed “appellate bodies,” and the decisions rendered, based on relevant treaties, are almost universally followed despite the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms.

**Recommendations (p. 143-146)**

1. Over the next few decades greatly expand the world’s judicial infrastructure. The following are needed:
   a. courts to adjudicate trans-national political disputes in the major regions and sub-regions of the world.
   b. specialized courts to deal with human rights disputes, environmental disputes, economic disputes, etc.
   c. universal compulsory jurisdiction for the ICJ and a broader purview in regard to criminal offenses.
   d. enhanced access to adjudication by non-state parties (international governmental organizations (IGOs) and international NGOs).
2. Make the ICJ an appellate court, limiting its caseload to disputes that cannot be resolved at the regional level or by an appropriate specialized court.
3. Where practicable, divide the ICJ into chambers, thereby enabling it to increase its caseload.
4. Establish the principle that court decisions in contentious cases shall be binding and enforceable.
5. Resort more frequently to the ICJ and regional courts for advisory opinions.
6. As circumstances permit, codify world, regional and sub-regional law.
7. Engage more women in the judiciary.

**QUESTIONS:**

1. *The recommendations noted above will be neither cheap nor easy.* What are the chief obstacles to be overcome in implementing them? In what ways might the benefits of doing so justify the investment? Which recommendations should be accorded top priority for action?

2. *Judgments that are “legal” are not necessarily just* (see top of p. 144). How should one deal with this problem?

3. *The book notes perceived criticisms of the current ICC* (p. 136-7). Are these criticisms warranted? If so, would implementation of the author’s recommendations resolve the problem? If not, what other systemic changes do you recommend?

The Peace Palace in The Hague, seat of the International Court of Justice
Unit 8: Coordination of UN Specialized Agencies and Special UN Commissions and Funds (p. 149-163)

Why Is This Important? (p. 149-150)

The scope of activities within the UN system has expanded enormously beyond the UN’s initial focus on peace and security. A wide range of activities is now performed by a constellation of global and largely autonomous specialized agencies. (For example, people fly more safely today because of the International Civil Aviation Organization; the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards nuclear power and monitors weapons programs; and so forth.) The expansion and increasing geographic dispersion of these agencies has been ad hoc, following no pre-ordained plan and without any rationale as to why certain activities are under the direction of core UN agencies while others are essentially autonomous specialized agencies. Nevertheless, many of these agencies have been among the most successful and well regarded of the UN system.

Key Issues (p. 153)

Effective though they are, the prolific and geographically diverse collection of agencies has led to extensive redundancy, serious gaps and/or misplaced emphases in the agendas of constituent agencies, inadequate coordination of agency activities, and inadequate and unpredictable funding (since many of these agencies are funded by UN member states, foundations or other private sources). Other problems include confusing lines of responsibility and reporting, insufficient transparency and accountability, the prevalence of political hypocrisy and double standards, and unrealistic systems of decision-making.

Possible Solutions (p. 154-161)

- Consolidation of agencies with related mandates (examples on p. 154)
- Transfer of certain activities to core UN agencies (examples on p. 154-5)
- More rational distribution of headquarters locations for greater efficiency and coordination (p. 155; the book suggests New York, Geneva, Washington DC (Bretton Woods Institutions), and The Hague (World Court / ICC)).
Regional offices for better coordination across various agencies (suggestions would include Nairobi for Africa South of the Sahara; Cairo for the Arab League; Beijing for China; Tokyo for East Asia; Geneva for Europe; New Delhi for India; Moscow for Russia and some of its neighbors; Bangkok for Southeast Asia; Tehran for West Asia; Vancouver for the Westminster League; and Montevideo – among many other possibilities – for Latin America and the Caribbean)

More effective central planning, with greater transparency and accountability, and with more open channels for communication among agencies within the UN system and with NGOs concerned with their agendas

Better coordination with and among regional and national centers, and between UN agencies and various government ministries within the countries where they work.

Appropriate weighted voting within agencies. While the formula appropriate for each agency will vary based on the functions that the agency performs, the decisions of each agency would receive greater respect if they were reached by realistically weighted voting formulae.

- Optimal balance between concerns of the stakeholders (the people) and the shareholders (the nations that control and/or pay the bills for various activities). (For example, the formula – p. 161 – for weighted voting in the Food and Agriculture Organization should include terms for population [consumers], number of persons employed in the agricultural sector [producers], value of agricultural production, and – in deference to traditional UN practice – existence as a sovereign state).

- Formulae should yield results that are nuanced and flexible (adjustable over time as warranted).

QUESTIONS:

1. The book recommends that headquarters for the multitude of UN and UN-affiliated agencies be centralized in New York, Geneva, Washington and The Hague, for greater efficiency and coordination. Yet, the author observes (p. 151-2 and 155) that many of these agencies are currently headquartered in cities around the world, and the host countries will want to protect what they see as a reflection of their political significance. None of these headquarter cities are in the global South. Can the logic of “efficiency and coordination” overcome resistance
from the South? Might not some exceptions be made (say, by putting the headquarters of the UN Population Fund in Africa, which has by far the world’s fastest rates of population growth)?

2. The weighted voting formulae put forward in the book are intended as workable suggestions, not uncontestable solutions. Which formulae would you choose to change, and why would you do so?

The principal United Nations building in Geneva, formerly the headquarters of the League of Nations
Why Is This Important? (p. 176)

The quality of human resources is a key to the successful functioning of any bureaucracy. Many shortcomings of the UN system can be attributed to deficiencies in the ways by which its personnel have been recruited, placed, utilized and promoted. The book proposes a set of workable ideas that would lead to a merit-based civil service that would be generally considered as acceptably equitable in respect to gender balance and the geographic distribution of positions at all employment levels.

Key Issues (p. 164-170)

Since its inception, the UN has experienced serious problems in recruiting, promoting and retaining UN Secretariat and other staff, and for them to meet needed standards. How the UN can best rid itself of incompetent and corrupt personnel poses a serious diplomatic problem.

- **The UN Charter** (Article 101, para. 3) calls for staff members that demonstrate “the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity,” who do “not seek or receive instructions from any government or other authority external to the Organization (Article 100).” Yet, appointments are often the result of political machinations (especially from the P-5 powers). Violations of the UN’s ideals are frequent and often egregious.

- **The UN Charter** (Article 101, para. 3) states the “importance of recruiting staff on as wide a geographic basis as possible”. But virtually all “general service” positions, as well as many professional positions, are excluded from this requirement. To the extent that regional balance is considered, the regions recognized differ markedly from agency to agency. Developed countries hold roughly half the professional staff positions, although they account for less than a fourth of the world’s population.

- To many UN employees, living the good life in New York has greater appeal than serving the Earth’s people.

- Women are significantly underrepresented at all levels of the UN.

The International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) was formed in 1974 to establish a common system for the UN and affiliated agencies in respect to hiring, salaries and conditions of professional staff employment. However, not all agencies accept its mandate. The Bretton Woods
agencies, as a prime example, retain their own rules, providing higher salaries and more employment perks than those allowed under ICSC jurisdiction, thereby negatively impacting UN retention of top-level talent as well as general morale.

**Possible Solutions (p. 170-176)**

**Guidelines for junior-level administrative staff:**
- In the secretariats of the UN and affiliated agencies, primary allegiance is ostensibly to global institutions, so the number of positions affiliated to individual member nations ought not to be of major concern. On the other hand, it is important that persons of diverse perspectives and cultural orientations be represented. This desirable diversity can be obtained through a system based on representation by major world regions and sub-regions.
  - Nine regions are suggested, each comparable in respect to population, global importance and size, and each widely recognized for its economic, cultural and/or political coherence.
  - The percentage of staff drawn from each region would fall within a range based on population and a constant of 1/9 of the total (11.1%).
  - To attain the widest geographic representation, recruitment “sub-regions” within each of the nine regions are suggested.
- In principle, “merit” would be defined as “inherent intelligence and potential for development.” In practice, as in most other bureaucracies, it may not always be possible to live up to this subjective ideal.
- A duly empowered, politically neutral UN Civil Service Commission would play a key role in recruitment. This presupposes better and more reliable funding (as recommended in Chapter 11).
- All professional recruits would spend an initial year in training under the auspices of a UN Administrative Academy (see Chapter 12).
- Four months of the initial training year would be spent in a stressful field location, and periodic alternation between headquarters and field posts would be a condition of employment and advancement.
- To create greater gender equity, percentage ranges are suggested (from 45-55% overall, to 35-65% for sub-regions and minor agencies).

**Guidelines for senior-level positions:**
The book recommends that *merit* be the principle determinant for senior-level positions (agency directors, assistant secretaries-general and under-secretaries-general). It endorses the following proposals:
• All vacancies at director level and higher would be advertised worldwide, with specific and rigorous requirements made explicit.
• The accuracy of resumes would be determined by a duly authorized UN body, and vetted resumes would be accessible to all GA members.
• No post would be reserved for a specific country or world region, and there would be no predetermined order of rotation among regions.
• There could be a requirement that successive holders of specific posts should not come from the same major world region, and/or that the post should alternate between developed and developing nations.
• GA balloting to select holders of top-level posts should be secret.

QUESTIONS:

1. The book states (p. 165) that “the UN Secretariat and affiliated organizations have had to grapple with numerous … issues contributing to low morale … [such as] the difficulty of staffing field missions in undesirable locations, corruption, the fallout from sexual misconduct …, and unrelenting pressures for reform put upon various agencies by those who pay the lion’s share of the bills …” How would the book’s proposals help to rectify these weaknesses?

2. Do you favor the suggested requirements (p. 171) that staff 1) spend approximately four months of their initial training year in a stressful field location, and 2) periodically alternate between headquarters and field posts in subsequent years? Why or why not?

3. The book acknowledges (p. 175) that filling senior-level posts primarily based on current (not potential) merit would benefit those of privilege, i.e., male candidates from developed countries. Does this concern you? Would you recommend other considerations for these top posts?
Why Is This Important? (p. 179-180)

To quote Kofi Annan: “A strong civil society promotes responsible citizenship and makes democratic forms of government work. A weak civil society supports authoritarian rule, which keeps society weak.” The legitimacy and effectiveness of decisions and policies will be enhanced when they are backed by expert advice and when stakeholders, acting individually or in coalitions, feel that they have had a meaningful voice. Sound advice is especially important in our increasingly complex and inter-connected world. Unsurprisingly, in recent decades the number of specialized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) established to deal with urgent global problems (the environment, human rights, etc.) has grown by leaps and bounds and is now estimated at more than a million. Of these, more than 250,000 with an international mandate are also known as INGOs. Well over 3,000 NGOs have been accredited to the UN via ECOSOC. Added to the chorus are the voices of special interest groups (e.g., organized labor), powerful multi-national corporations (MNCs), multi-purpose foundations, the media, professional societies, faith-based organizations, and other components of what is loosely referred to as civil society. How to bring a modicum of order to the cacophony of competing voices and agendas is the principal challenge addressed in this Unit.

Key Issues (p. 180-187)

Though decidedly positive overall, the proliferation of agencies also has some negative aspects for the United Nations system:

1. The glut of information produced is largely indigestible, often inconsistent, redundant or sometimes even inaccurate.
2. NGO agendas are often in opposition to one another (e.g. “pro-life” and “pro-choice” agencies in respect to abortion and birth control).
3. Worthy NGOs from the global South generally lack the numbers and financial and professional resources to compete for influence with major NGOs of the global North; this is particularly evident at major international conferences (on the environment, population, human rights, etc.) and at the periodic World Social Forum.
4. NGOs and supportive UN agencies are often pitted against alliances of powerful MNCs and business-friendly governments (e.g., as in opposition to the WTO, given its allegedly anti-environmental and anti-labor policies).

5. Many NGOs are, for a variety of reasons, of dubious merit, among them the spurious so-called “GONGOs” (government-organized non-governmental organizations).

6. Wealthy, unaccountable corporations and foundations can leverage their financial power to bend programs and priorities of particular agencies with the UN system to their own advantage.

**Possible Solutions (p. 187-197)**

1. Five self-financing “civil society coordinating councils” (CSCCs) are proposed, one each to deal with: human rights, the environment, development, peace and security, and democratic governance.
   - Participation in the election of and work in one or more CSCC would be open to any NGO on condition of paying small membership fees, abiding by the council’s code of conduct, and filing annual activity reports.
   - Failure to adhere to the stated conditions could result in expulsion from a CSCC.
   - NGOs could organize in ad hoc coalitions to deal with specific issues or issue clusters (e.g., women’s rights, rights for indigenous peoples).
   - Coalition reports and proposals would be forwarded to appropriate CSCCs, which would, in turn, consolidate and organize them and send them, as needed, to the appropriate UN agency (e.g. HRC).
   - Each CSCC would be responsible for two-way information flows between appropriate organs of the UN and civil society organizations (CSOs).
   - Dissenting opinions and reports may become a part of the record.
   - Recipient UN agencies would evaluate CSCC reports, take action where desirable and feasible, and forward them, with their own recommendations, to other concerned UN agencies.
   - The voting weight of each participating NGO would depend on a formula taking into account its annual budget, the number of countries in which it operates, and its status (if any, as assigned by ECOSOC/ESEC) as a UN accredited agency.
   - The share of each major world region in the membership of each CSCC would depend on a formula taking into account the region’s
population and the cumulative weights of member NGOs. On balance, this measure would enhance the relative power of the global South.

- NGOs in countries with GNIs above the world average would be required to help subsidize participation of NGOs from poor countries according to a sliding income scale.

2. The private business sector should increasingly be incorporated into local development plans through “global compacts” (GCs), voluntarily negotiated among one or more host countries, one or more MNCs and one or more UN agencies.
   - GCs would be *ad hoc*, varying greatly in scale, type and duration.
   - GCs would be required to follow established codes of conduct, file annual reports and accept oversight by an appropriate agency.
   - Participating firms that failed egregiously to meet established norms could be excluded from a GC roster.

**QUESTIONS:**

1. *How does the UN presently work with civil society, and how might those interactions be improved in the relatively short term?*

2. *Presently, there is nothing remotely like the proposed CSCCs. Do you think that so complicated a system could work? Would its recommendations be regarded as fair? Would they be wise? How could fairness and wisdom be encouraged among such councils?*

3. *The global compact system is already well established and has had some major successes. But might it not represent an unacceptable threat to local modes of production and governance? If so, what changes are needed?*
Unit 11: The Problem of Funding (p. 201-224)

**Why Is This Important? (p. 201, 221)**

How best to finance the many tasks entrusted to the UN system has been a major concern since the UN’s founding. How the burden might be most fairly and effectively shared has yet to be systematically addressed. Additionally, funding levels remain far from adequate for the effective performance of many UN functions. Differences in national assessment levels vary substantially from one biennial budget to the next. Determining and justifying these differences polarizes the UN along North-South lines, creating an atmosphere of pervasive mistrust. Additionally, the ratio of arrearages to total budget has increased substantially. Thus, the system has found it expedient to rely increasingly on voluntary contributions, creating potential problems where donor and UN agendas diverge. In the meantime, the magnitude of challenges requiring the attention of the UN system has expanded dramatically. A simple, equitable and effective system – one that is prepared to meet future fiscal demands – is needed.

**Key Issues (p. 202-214)**

Financial mechanisms: The most important of the few functions for which the General Assembly exercises binding authority is approving the UN budget and apportioning expenses among UN members. The Secretary-General and UN Secretariat are charged with planning responsibility; the GA has the duty of discussing, recommending changes in, and approving the budget. Various committees and boards are involved, and redundancy is common.

The regular budget: The regular budget (excluding funds for peacekeeping, affiliated agencies and special projects) has always been remarkably low. For the 2016-2017 biennium it came to only $5.4 billion. In real terms the regular budget slightly more than doubled over a period of 36 years (1971-2007) – an annual growth rate of just 2%. However, in real terms the budget for the 2016-2017 biennium is 3.5% less than for 2014-2015.

Complicated mathematical formulae, based largely on presumed capacity to pay, have been used to determine assessments for each member nation. These have never been uniformly applied, and are frequently modified. Despite enormous disparities in assessments, the UN clings to
the legal fiction of the sovereign equality of nations and accords all members equal votes in the GA and most UN agencies. The gaping disconnect between the diplomatic pretense of equality and the behind-the-scenes political recognition of inequality contributes to perennial tension between the large and the small, the rich and the poor.

The US has always paid the largest share, as is appropriate based on GNI; but pressure from the US Senate has driven this percentage down (now 22%, well below the US share of world GDP). Consequently, Japan, wealthier EU member nations and Canada, Australia and New Zealand have had to make up the resultant funding shortfall.

The P-5 share of the total budget has decreased steadily from its initial high of 71%, even though these five countries retain their veto power in the Security Council. This continuing retention of power is widely regarded with disfavor in many quarters.

Arrearages have been endemic throughout the UN’s history; and the ratio of arrearages to total budget has increased substantially in recent decades. A state in arrears to the extent of two years of its assessed obligation may have its vote forfeited. Many states (including the US at times) have paid just enough of their back dues to avoid losing their GA voting rights.

The peacekeeping budget: Funding for peacekeeping missions has been carried out on an ad hoc basis. Numerous formulae have been devised, with even less predictability or regularity than for the regular budget. In the last several decades the peacekeeping budget has greatly outpaced growth in the regular budget. However, the level of actual spending fluctuates markedly; arrearages in regard to the unpredictable costs of peacekeeping have been greater than those for the regular budget. Failure to respond adequately (as in Rwanda, Darfur, etc.) has accentuated severe political stress and unconscionable suffering among affected populations and are major blots on the UN’s record. The present (non-)system guarantees delays.

Voluntary contributions: The volume and sources of voluntary funding are highly unpredictable. Contributions come overwhelmingly from wealthy nations. Over the past quarter century, voluntary funding has been close to or slightly more than double assessed funding. The purposes for which the funding may be used are largely established by the leading donor nation or private agencies. UN officer, Iqbal Haji, notes “this situation is tantamount to ‘UN à la carte’ … [enabling] a group of countries … to
finance activities under the UN label, that are in accord with their national priorities.”

Possible Solutions (p. 214-222)

The book suggests doing away with the multiple budgets that the GA must now establish and substituting a single consolidated budget. The following guidelines are proposed:
1. Assess all nations, however rich or poor, at a uniform, low and affordable rate based on their respective GNIs (0.1% of GNI initially).
2. The revenue thus raised should more than suffice to cover all costs for functions presently carried out by the UN system, not only via funds raised in the regular and peacekeeping budgets but also for the specialized agencies and activities made possible by voluntary contributions.
3. Establish an escrow account from resultant surplus funding to enable the UN to cope with unforeseeable future emergencies.
4. Accept voluntary contributions only if they are provided with the understanding that the donor will not be able to determine or unduly influence the leadership or agenda of the agencies or programs being funded.
5. Include payments to the UN as one among several elements in weighted voting formulae.
6. Respond to national failure to meet funding obligations with automatic proportional reduction of the nation’s weighted vote.
7. Charge interest on late budgetary payments at clearly specified rates.

QUESTIONS:

1. The book discusses the difficult relationship between the US and the UN in terms of its UN dues (pages 206-7, 219). Most Americans would be surprised to learn that the US, in fact, pays a lower percentage of its annual income than all other developed nations. Ill-informed criticism of the UN is common in the US. What impression did you have about UN funding and your own country’s relationship to the UN prior to reading this book (this chapter in particular)? Has that now changed?

2. What do you think of the author’s proposed budgetary system? What are its advantages / disadvantages in comparison to the proposed “Tobin tax” on non-productive financial transactions (see p. 214-15).
3. The book (p. 218-220) lists several likely, but dubious, arguments against implementation of the proposed budgetary system: the lack of a progressive tax design; a significantly larger UN budget that could lead to a “socialist world government”; significantly larger assessments for most nations; regulations for the acceptance of voluntary contributions; etc. Can you think of other likely objections? How would you respond to critics of these proposals?

Some thought-provoking annual financial allocations for the United Nations and other entities
(Data are for the latest year available)

- U.S. defense budget (2016), $598 billion
- New York City expenditures, (2016), $81.7 billion
- Entire UN system, budget (2014), $46.3 billion
- UN peacekeeping budget (2016), $16.8 billion
- N.Y. City, uniformed services (2016), $9.42 billion
- Harvard University, operational expenditures (2016), $4.78 billion
- UN regular assessed budget (2017), $2.78 billion
- U.S. share (22%) of regular assessed budget (2017), $0.611 billion
Unit 12: Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Disarmament (p. 225-271)

Editors’ note: As this Unit relates to a very long, diverse and important chapter, discussion groups would probably benefit from taking it up in two meetings.

Why Is This Important? (p. 225-226)

Security – “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” – has been the principal preoccupation of the United Nations since its inception. Yet more than 50 million persons – overwhelmingly civilians – have perished in, or as a direct result of, interstate and civil wars since the conclusion of the Second World War. Clearly, success in meeting the UN’s principal goal has been far from satisfactory. How best to maintain peace and, more recently, to build peace has been the source of intense, and sometimes acrimonious debate at the UN. Questions of war, peace and disarmament will undoubtedly remain salient in the years ahead. Many security reform proposals have been advanced; but the existence of two sets of rules, one for the P-5 and another for the rest of the planet, appears – incorrectly – to be an insurmountable hurdle. In this Unit, we consider several key innovations with the potential to substantially mitigate the UN’s frequent inability to take effective action when needed. One, already adopted (but still in need of refinement) is the principle of “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P; see text box at the end of this Unit). Others proposed in the book are a United Nations Peace Corps (UNPC) and a United Nations Administrative Reserve Corps (UNARC).

Key Issues: Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (p. 226-243)

While there have undoubtedly been a number of outstanding successes in UN-authorized peacekeeping initiatives, there have also been numerous failures. We focus here mainly on the latter.

1. Though Article 33 of the UN Charter outlines a broad range of non-military methods for dealing with threats to the peace, there has been inadequate resort to their use, thereby leaving the problems to fester or deteriorate into violent conflict.
2. The number of significant conflicts in the world far exceeds the capacity of current regional and UN mechanisms to deal with them.
3. Conflict resolution through the intervention of regional organizations has also been far from adequate.

4. Devising SC resolutions to authorize peacekeeping operations (PKOs) is often thwarted by global or regional geopolitical considerations.

5. PKOs authorized by the SC are seldom adequately funded, and member nations have been slow to provide personnel required for the mission.

6. The mandates of authorized missions are often insufficiently clear, and exit strategies are left unstated or are never formulated at all.

7. The general UN rule requiring PKO neutrality has enabled the commission of atrocities (e.g., as in Srebrenica) by one or more disputing parties.

8. There has been a marked shift in the countries providing military personnel (especially after the failure of the American-led missions to Somalia in 1991-95). Peacekeepers are now overwhelmingly provided by countries from the global South, and many of them are poorly trained and equipped.

9. Criminal activities (including arms sales and grave sexual offenses) by peacekeeping forces have become increasingly common.

10. Attempts by countries of the global North to establish elite standby rapid deployment brigades for use in support of the UN have been inadequately supported; and nations contributing to such efforts have reserved their sovereign prerogative of withdrawing from missions when they see fit to do so.

11. Funding and other forms of support for the Peacebuilding Commission, established in 2005, has been especially meager.

12. The initial application of military force in Libya under the R2P principle went far beyond the mandate established for it by the SC and has had catastrophic and persisting consequences.

13. SC failure to apply the R2P doctrine in many areas other than Libya has led to accusations of applying double standards, thereby tarnishing the SC’s already unfavorable image.

The UN’s frequent inability or unwillingness to respond satisfactorily to threats to the peace has (since 1990) led to numerous military operations that are not under UN control. In particular, the United States has increasingly assumed the role of world policeman, expending staggering sums on military forays into countries presumed to pose threats to either America or its allies. Its proclaimed “global war on terrorism” has led to the devastation of both Afghanistan and Iraq and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. Distrust of the motives of the US and its allies is widespread and deep.
QUESTIONS:

1. Article 33 of the UN Charter states that parties to disputes, within or among nations, should seek solutions by “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements…” Why has this admonition been so often ignored? What might improve the likelihood of utilizing these diplomatic methods?

2. The book discusses the pros and cons of using sanctions (p. 228). When, in your view, are sanctions warranted and in what form? Are there bad as well as good sanctions, and, if so, what distinguishes them?

Possible Solutions: Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

A continuing challenge is the multiplicity of civil or regional conflicts raging simultaneously (Issues #2 and 13 above). Some system for prioritizing UN involvement is needed. Both short-term and long-term reforms are needed.

In the short-term, the UN must increasingly resort to proactive diplomacy, place greater reliance on regional bodies as peace-promoting intermediaries, and judiciously apply targeted sanctions when UN and regional efforts are rebuffed. When none of these peaceful measures suffice, the P-5 powers must refrain from use of the veto when confronted with serious breaches of international law (genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity).

Greater use and more even-handed use should be made of the R2P principle, and the caveats to prevent its misapplication (p.238) must be observed.

Allowing reasonable time for transitional arrangements (p.251-252 and 254-256), two key agencies are envisaged: a) a United Nations Peace Corps (UNPC), and b) a United Nations Administrative Reserve Corps (UNARC). These are detailed below.

a) UN Peace Corps (p. 243-252):
- An all-volunteer, elite force open to qualified (and well-vetted) men and women worldwide.
• A force under the direct command of the United Nations, precluding the possibility of individual nations withdrawing their troops.
• A standing force sufficiently large to cope, on short notice, with most foreseeable threats to the peace.
• A force stationed at multiple bases in willing countries in three regional commands and functioning in the languages (English, French and Spanish) most practical for the region in question.
• In addition to basic training (including negotiating skills and cultural sensitivity), specialized training useful for both military and post-service activities will be imparted during the period of UNPC service.
• Forces will be lightly, but well, equipped, sufficiently to maintain order, but not to engage in large offensive operations.
• Until the UNPC has its own capability, essential logistic support would be provided, on lease, from capable nations.
• UNPC personnel will be fully engaged in peacebuilding activities in host countries during periods when they are not militarily deployed. (Strategically, peacebuilding is a more important goal than peacekeeping.)
• Limited terms of service would preclude the emergence of a large military class and would increase the total number of young men and women benefitting from UNPC service.
• Upon receiving a formal emergency appeal from a simple majority of SC members (whether or not that majority included all P-5 members), the Secretary-General would be authorized to initiate rapid deployment of a limited force – say up to 10,000 troops – for a period not to exceed six months. This recommended emergency provision would enable the UN to give long overdue credence to the R2P principle. Maintaining a UNPC force authorized by the SG beyond the initial period of deployment would require authorization by the SC.

The costs of establishing and maintaining the proposed UNPC would substantially exceed those of all current UN peacekeeping operations. While these costs may at first appear prohibitive, they pale in comparison to the world’s national military outlays. One should also compare the likely UNPC costs to the vastly greater expenses for wars it could avert, not merely the costs of military operations but also the incalculable costs of lives lost, property destroyed, and massive environmental degradation. Additionally, many benefits would flow from the UNPC’s non-military functions. The global community needs to liberate itself from its penny-wise, pound-foolish mode of response to looming threats of violence.
Experience indicates that the endemic problems that initially resulted in the need for a given PKO frequently lead to recurrence of fighting or threats to the peace soon after UN forces are withdrawn. Weakness of the local administrative infrastructure is a major cause of these breakdowns. A competent UNARC could greatly mitigate the problem.

UNARC would have the following characteristics:

- Its staff would be comprised mainly of highly capable, mid-career male and female volunteers from the global South.
- Recruitment and management of the volunteers would be based on memoranda of understanding between the UN Secretariat and the countries from which the volunteers came. Individual enlistments would be of not less than ten-years duration.
- UNARC staff would serve as a reserve corps of specially trained civil servants, available on short notice, to assume management of necessary administrative tasks in areas where PKOs were underway or recently concluded and in which the administrative infrastructure had broken down.
- Training of UNARC staff would take place at a UN Administrative Academy over a period of several years, and would include a basic core curriculum, courses in specific administrative functions, and deep immersion into the history, language and culture of specific world regions where PKOs are likely to be needed. They would also obtain specialized expertise in fields such as finance, personnel management, law, police administration, sanitation and public health, communications technology and so forth.
- In the field, UNARC staff would work under the direction of the local PKO. Their function would be to train their successors, thereby working themselves out of a job as quickly as possible.
- Volunteers would be encouraged to take refresher courses from time to time to maintain and improve their skills.

QUESTIONS:

1. Review the book’s suggestions (p. 227-8) on the need to prioritize and proactively resolve the many significant global conflicts raging simultaneously throughout the world. How might such new policies best be presented and implemented?
2. Can a peacekeeping / peacebuilding force comprised of volunteers from throughout the world be made functional? (Consider the French Foreign Legion and other historical examples.)

3. Can the UN itself be trusted to provide the skilled and cohesive leadership to bring about globally legitimate resolutions to local conflicts where different world powers back opposing sides?

4. Even with the suggested total force of 300,000 the UNPC would be incapable of stopping an armed conflict between any two major world powers. Yet – perhaps because of the fear of MAD (mutually assured destruction) or other inevitable damage from powerful “conventional” weapons – there has been no war between two or more major powers since the Chinese and American confrontation in Korea. In light of these facts, do you believe it would still be worthwhile to create a UNPC?

5. The costs of implementing and maintaining a UNPC would be substantial, far exceeding current UN peacekeeping budgets. Are you convinced by the cost/benefit ratio arguments presented in the book (p. 248-51)? How might the expected resistance from the military-industrial complex be overcome?

6. What are the pros and cons of establishing UNARC? What significant advantages do you see, even if most UNARC volunteers are never called to active duty?

**Key Issue: Arms Control and Disarmament (p. 256-60)**

Our planet has lived with the specter of nuclear war since 1945. We have gone through periods when the threat of war was particularly high (e.g., the Cuban missile crisis of 1962), and have seen the number of nuclear powers increase from one to nine. As a result, most people today have become so inured to a threat they feel powerless to contain that their prevailing response is one of denial. The same holds true in regard to other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially biological weapons. Nevertheless, intermittent bilateral and multi-lateral negotiations aimed at controlling nuclear arms and other WMD have been numerous. These began with the US’s Baruch Plan of 1946 to put all nuclear weapons and technology under the control of the then newly created UN Atomic Energy Commission. However, the proposal was scuttled by the USSR because of the proposed insistence on external inspection, which would have violated Soviet sovereignty. In 1961, an even more comprehensive set of
accords was worked out by John McCloy (US) and Valerian Zorin (USSR), only to be rejected by mistrustful hawks in both Cold War camps. Arguably, the most important nuclear pact is the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; but four of the nine current nuclear powers (India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea) have refused to sign. The threat of nuclear catastrophe persists and may even be increasing.

**Recommendation: Arms Control and Disarmament**

The book advocates for the total abolition of WMDs (nuclear, biological and chemical) and the establishment of effective inspection regimes, largely based on the McCloy-Zorin accords and other recent proposals.

Failure to reach a workable agreement has little to do with the absence of an appropriate UN oversight agency. Rather, the basic problem is an absence of the requisite level of trust in a world still dominated by a tribal ethos. This may be derived from our biological inheritance, but aggressiveness has been sublimated in a number of peace-loving countries and communities.

Still, there is worldwide, popular and governmental support for nuclear disarmament. NGO networks maintain their efforts for reform. In respect to biological and chemical warfare, noteworthy accords have been reached and generally honored. Civil society has been effective in promoting support for a treaty outlawing anti-personnel mines (a treaty not signed, however, by the US, Russia, China and India). These advances should give us reason for hope. Civil society can and should continue to work collectively to outlaw WMDs in general.

**Key Issue: Terrorism (p. 260-263)**

Terrorism has emerged as a major global issue since the traumatic events of 9/11/2001. While it continues to be addressed mainly at the national level, it has also become a significant concern to various parts of the UN system. One must, however, recognize a fundamental paradox, that one side’s “terrorist” is often the other side’s “freedom fighter.”

**Recommendations: Terrorism**

1. Adoption of a more deliberative approach in confronting terrorism, with greater international and interregional cooperation and greater use of INTERPOL (the International Criminal Police Organization).
2. Greatly increased efforts to address the root conditions of injustice that create and sustain terrorist networks.

**QUESTIONS:**

*This chapter indicates that civil society organizations have been most effective in advancing nuclear/WMD disarmament efforts.*

1. What NGOs are you aware of that are working on these issues? What are their stances and current campaigns?

2. In today’s current political climate, what do you anticipate in regard to the success of nuclear/WMD disarmament efforts? What actions and positions are most important at this time?

3. Low-probability events – including nuclear war – sooner or later do occur. If we do not eliminate or vastly reduce nuclear weapons, what do you suppose will be the life expectancy of our planet?

Female soldiers, such as these women from Bangladesh, can play a major role in peacekeeping operations.
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (p. 238-240)

The following discussion relates to matters that were unfolding as the original English edition of the book went to press.

Mindful of the United Nations’ failure to avert the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which approximately 800,000 innocent civilians perished in roughly three months, and recalling other genocidal behavior, such as the massacre of Bosnians at Srebenica in 1991, the Canadian government established an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), whose 2001 report first articulated the radical “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) principle. We highlight that principle here because – along with the creation of the International Criminal Court in 2002 (Unit 7 of this Guide) – it changes our understanding of national sovereignty, challenging the traditional view that governments may act with impunity and do whatever they wish within their national boundaries. Rather, R2P proclaims that sovereignty confers responsibility as well as rights, specifically the responsibility to protect a nation’s population from egregious violation of their human rights. Further, it calls on the international community to assume that responsibility, possibly including the use of force, when a given government neither can nor will do so.

Following much debate, the R2P principle was included in the Outcome Document of the UNGA’s 2005 summit meeting. But that document failed to include a set of ICISS caveats intended to prevent abuses in the name of R2P. Among those caveats were provisions that forceful intervention would be undertaken only: a) to prevent large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing (rather than for other political motives), b) as a last resort (i.e., when diplomacy had failed), c) when it had reasonable prospects for success, and d) when the consequences would not be worse than those of inaction.

Although mentioned in several SC resolutions in the period 2006-2009, it was not until 2011, during the so-called “Arab Spring,” that the R2P idea was put to its first major test. In that year, a popular uprising in Libya was severely suppressed by the then dictator, Muammar al-Qaddafi, and a credible threat existed of additional mass violence. In the absence of a UN force capable of reestablishing order, the SC entrusted the task to a US-led NATO coalition, which soon exceeded its mandate, deposing Qaddafi and violating most of the ICISS caveats. Aerial bombardment and ground fighting between pro- and anti-Qaddafi forces resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and the exodus of between a fourth and a third of
Libya’s population (overwhelmingly immigrant workers). The civil war – now involving numerous militias – continues in conditions of anarchy.

No R2P authorization of the use of force has occurred since the Libyan fiasco, despite the existence of numerous nations – most of them allied to the US – with repressive regimes comparable to that of Qaddafi. This has led to charges of the UN’s employing a double standard and becoming a vehicle of neo-colonialism. The backlash is widespread, especially in the global South. Clearly, the well-intentioned R2P principle needs further work if it is to survive and protect those for whom it was designed.

QUESTIONS:

1. If it were in your power to decide, when would you deem it appropriate to intervene forcefully in another nations’ problems?

2. When, if ever, would it be appropriate for other nations to intervene, peacefully or otherwise, in the problems of your nation?

3. How would you modify and strengthen the caveats intended to prevent abuse of the R2P principle and create conditions to ensure that abuses do not occur?

4. Would the creation of a UN Peace Corps (UNPC), as proposed earlier in this Unit, help resolve some of the problems noted for R2P?

Much of the UN’s field activity provides humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons.
Why Is This Important? (p. 272-274)

Societies and economies are guided by paradigms that most people accept as received truth and often adhere to long after the validity of those paradigms becomes problematic. This chapter examines two increasingly dysfunctional paradigms that now need to be revised or replaced. The first, the notion that economic growth is *ipso facto* good, must be supplanted by the belief that future growth must be *sustainable*. One cannot have continuous growth in a finite system without destroying the system. Second is the belief that all spaces or things should be under the exclusive control of sovereign states and that, within a state, all things may be regarded as commodities subject to individual ownership. In many situations, this idea must yield to the *common heritage* principle, which holds that portions of our environment cannot be appropriated and must be regarded as belonging to the whole of humankind. Sustainability and the common heritage principle are *core* solutions to the largest problems of our time.

Key Issues (p. 274-87)

**Sustainable Development**

Only recently has the world begun to come to terms, often grudgingly, with the finite and fragile nature of its resource base. This is especially true of its supplies of petroleum, control of which has provided the generally misrepresented *raison d'être* for so many conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere. But the supply of other minerals and, more importantly, of arable land, is also limited. There is no guarantee, despite major scientific advances in agricultural productivity, that food production will keep pace with population growth. Wars over water, a resource most persons in affluent societies have long taken for granted, are increasingly likely. In some places (e.g. Sudan) such wars are already underway.

Over much of the world, human agency is degrading large swaths of the natural environment essential for the maintenance of healthy ecosystems and ultimately of human life. Nowhere is this more evident than in the wholesale clearing of tropical rainforests for the sake of short-term gains for forest industries, ranchers and previously landless farmers. Extinction
or decimation of plant and animal species is rampant and increasing rapidly. Rising atmospheric and ocean temperatures are causing massive melting of glaciers, thawing of permafrost and the destruction of coral reefs. The threat posed by rising ocean levels is incalculable.

UN-sponsored conferences have already addressed these problems in many ways, as have civil society and academia. Intelligently formulated and practicable recommendations abound. In 2015, the UNGA adopted a set of 17 “Sustainable Development Goals,” including 169 specific targets (http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/), to be achieved globally (not just in developing nations) by the year 2030. The problem is that, in the absence of meaningful enforcement mechanisms, the quest for short-term economic gain almost always trumps wisdom and long-term economic welfare. Humankind continues on a self-destructive course.

The Global Commons

Neither states nor private individuals should enjoy an unfettered right to do whatever they wish in regard to resources that they did not create, especially when their actions have adverse environmental consequences for other parts of our shared planet. Hence the need to recognize the applicability of a “common heritage” principle in regard to the atmosphere, the electromagnetic spectrum, the high seas, Antarctica, the moon and outer space. These should be shared and managed by the whole of humankind and, to the extent that their use generates wealth, that wealth should be equitably shared.

In fact, various treaties are already in place that conform to the common heritage principle. Antarctica, for example, has been a region of remarkably effective cooperation among nations, even those that have elsewhere been adversaries. Multi-national cooperation in space, especially between the USA and Russia, has also been noteworthy. Other treaties have had less successful outcomes. For instance, negotiations based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea resulted in capitulation to the territorial demands of coastal states for a 200 nautical mile “exclusive economic zone” (EEZ), rather than maximizing the portion of the ocean subject to the common heritage principle. And thus far there has been no consequent sharing of commons-derived wealth.

Nor has any consensus emerged in regard to how far the common heritage principle should extend. Should it, for example, be applicable to such natural wonders as the Grand Canyon, Victoria Falls, the Great Barrier Reef off the coast of Australia and hundreds of other locales
designated as “world natural heritage sites”? And what about cultural creations such as China’s Great Wall, India’s Taj Mahal, Peru’s Machu Picchu, and the city of Venice, deemed to be of “outstanding universal value”? What of Earth’s atmosphere, which is of concern not only because of what humans put into it but also because of its role as the medium through which telecommunication signals travel? Finally, what of the genetic codes of human, plant and animal genomes, components of which, are of potential medical value for humans everywhere? Who should make the crucial decisions of what may be classified as “intellectual property” and how broad or binding those decisions should be, and how might one ensure that the decisions are honored?

Possible Solutions (p. 287-292)

1. Broaden and strengthen the mandate of ECOSOC, reformed as ESEC (Economic, Social and Environmental Council) (as discussed in Unit 5), greatly increasing its ability to coordinate and monitor the policies of other UN agencies and, in particular, the Sustainable Development Goals. Policy formulation will need to:
   a. reconcile the demands of stakeholders with markedly differing perspectives:
      i. those preferring market-based decisions and those inclined towards government planning;
      ii. industrialized and relatively unindustrialized states;
      iii. rich and poor;
      iv. states with secular democracies and theocracies;
      v. states under severe environmental stress and states that are relatively free from such concerns.
   b. accept the policy implications of scientific evidence.
   c. promote an ethos that puts global welfare and intergenerational equity ahead of the near-term interests of nations with rich resource endowments and of corporate giants.
   d. establish a credible system of sanctions for rule violators (but apply sanctions only as a last resort).

2. Establish a UN Common Heritage Council comprised of experts elected by the GA (along with the WPA should such a body be established), to serve in an advisory capacity only. Council members would represent all major sectors of the scientific community (biological sciences, physical sciences, social sciences), the humanities (including law and theology), and the private sector. Additionally, they would be drawn from all major regions of the world, include representatives from
indigenous communities, landlocked and small island states, and be
gender balanced.
3. Establish a carefully considered international principle of “eminent
domain,” enabling the UN to regulate and tax the use of portions of the
environment (especially in the oceans and atmosphere) of vital interest
to human survival.

QUESTIONS:

1. The adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals indicates that the
UN system (and most of its member nations) have at last recognized
the salience of sustainability in the future management of the world’s
economies. But endorsing sustainability and actually implementing the
needed changes in policy, with strict monitoring for non-compliance,
are two different things. What will be necessary to persuade individual
societies/economies to make the needed adjustments, and how can the
UN best contribute to this effort?

2. In recent years, many political forces and MNCs have rejected scientific
evidence in regard to environmental issues. How can the UN system
best deal with this problem?

3. Population growth will affect sustainability and the establishment of
any global commons in many ways. List those that you believe are
most important.

4. The ideas of establishing additional global commons and a global right
of eminent domain are among the most revolutionary recommendations
put forward in the book. They are certain to be hotly contested, despite
the fact that the Antarctic, the atmosphere, much of the high seas, and
outer space are already regarded as global commons. Can you devise a
general principle, or set of principles, specifying what spaces may or
may not be converted to global commons and how those spaces might
best be governed?

5. It is one thing to establish a commons in uninhabited spaces (such as
Antarctica), but quite another when dealing with populated places
under the sovereignty of a particular state, or with the human genome.
When, if ever, should one consider extending the idea of the commons
to these new domains?
Unit 14: A New Global Governance Architecture (p. 296-318)

Editors’ note. To facilitate thought and discussion, the range of issues touched upon in this Unit goes beyond those treated in Chapter 14 (though all the issues are discussed somewhere in the book).

Why Is This Important? (p. 296-302)

This chapter demonstrates the possibility of organizing the multitude of existing and proposed agencies discussed in chapters 2 through 13 into what could become a coherent and workable system of democratic federal world government. Such a system would not create a Utopia, but rather a world that is sufficiently workable to sustain a decent existence for the vast majority of humankind. It is doubtful that anything less can do so.

While the book recognizes the very low probability that the future system of global governance will be designed exactly as indicated here, we hope that the model envisaged will generate creative discussion and lead to refinements of the proposals offered.

Key Issues

We note below only a few of the many problematic aspects of the present world system of governance:

1. The UN is a voluntary confederacy of states, rather than a true, permanent federation. It either totally lacks, or possesses only in embryonic form, the attributes of viable federal government.
2. As a rule, the UN’s decisions are non-binding and may be ignored with impunity.
3. Linkages among various agencies of the UN system are inadequately developed.
4. Inadequate use is made of emergent regional organizations over most of the world.
5. The will of ordinary citizens and the expertise available among civil society organizations is largely ignored in UN decision-making.
6. The UN lacks a true executive; the Secretary-General’s fundamental role is that of an administrator; only by default – and to a very limited extent – can the SG exercise significant political leadership.
7. The UN lacks both adequate planning and funding mechanisms.
Possible Solutions (p. 298-316)

We recommend a potential workable system of global governance (Fig. 14.1, p. 299), a constitutional system of democratic, federal world government. It would include:

- a clear division of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government;
- a system of checks and balances among the three branches to prevent excessive accumulation of power by any one of them;
- systems of weighted voting that realistically reflect the actual distribution of power in the world at large, but which move progressively toward a “one-person-one-vote” goal;
- a division of legislative competence between the central (federal) and lower (regional, national and local) levels of government, whereby, according to the “principle of subsidiarity,” legislative tasks are performed by agencies at the lowest governmental level competent to perform them;
- meaningful voices for civil society;
- maximal governmental transparency and accountability;
- an ability to raise sufficient revenue to maintain the system;
- mechanisms whereby criminal behavior by groups and individuals may be identified and appropriately punished.

A summary of the components of the proposed system follows:

**Field I: Constitutionally specified core agencies with omnibus mandates, extending to all domains of UN concern.**

- Executive Council: made up of a selected number of individuals (we recommend 12), elected by the Legislature from a slate of regionally-chosen candidates. (Recommended functions are listed on p. 301). Plural executive power, with the presidency rotating among the Council members; this would preclude the ascendancy of any single region, political bloc or nation (see p. 310-313 and ch.4).
- Legislature (empowered to enact binding legislation, limited to a restricted range of truly global concerns):
  - General Assembly: representing states, including future regional federations (see ch. 2)
  - World Parliamentary Assembly: representing people (see ch.3)
• International Court of Justice: The supreme judicial body. Jurists nominated by the Executive Council and approved by the Legislature. Would try only cases deemed to be of major global importance.

• Secretariat: UN administrative functions. Headed by an elected Secretary-General. Administrative and ceremonial functions, facilitates execution of the decisions and programs of other UN agencies, translations, facilitating liaison among UN agencies and between UN and non-UN agencies.

Agencies other than those in Field I are arranged by four functional domains: security, human welfare, economics, and the environment.

**Field II: specialized core agencies. Constitutionally specified.** (p. 302-4) Would include UN Peace Corps (ch.11), International Criminal Court (ch.7), Human Rights Council (ch.6), ESEC (ch.5) and Common Heritage Council (ch.13). An Electoral Commission would ensure fairness of elections at the global level, and a Board of Auditors would examine the financial accounts of all entities within the UN system, thereby creating greater transparency and accountability throughout the UN system. Also recommended are an Economic Court and an Environmental Court.

**Field III: non-core UN agencies (p. 304-10):** Numerous specialized agencies (e.g. WHO, UNESCO, ILO, etc.) to coordinate and perform needed tasks.

**Interface between Fields III and IV (p. 313-16): Coordinating Councils representing civil society agencies legally outside the UN, but increasingly influential in UN decision-making.** Each of these Councils (ch.10) would examine, weigh, and consolidate the salient concerns of groups of NGOs working on related clusters of issues (peace and security, human rights, democratic governance, development and the environment); Global Compacts (ch.10), whereby non-governmental entities (mainly corporations) may cooperate with UN agencies to promote development goals, would be enhanced.

Regional and lower level organizations (not indicated on Fig. 14.1) would also play an important role in resolving non-global issues.

Throughout the book, we have indicated possible solutions to a host of structural and functional problems. We do not suggest, however, that there is any obviously best sequencing for bringing about the changes recommended. The trajectory of change will depend in part on world events that are largely beyond human control, as well as on the actions
and agendas of future global leaders. Nevertheless, we offer here some recommendations in regard to a few possible high-priority initiatives:

1. **A World Parliamentary Assembly (ch.3).** In the age of mass and instantaneous information flows, it is becoming increasingly difficult for political leaders to ignore the expressed will of the public they supposedly serve. A well-designed WPA can provide legitimate expressions of that will, even if only, at the outset, in an advisory capacity. It may also serve as a catalyst for further change.

2. **Better revenue generation capacity (ch.11).** Little can be accomplished without reliable funding. The UN could escape from its role as a perennial supplicant to a handful of the world’s wealthiest nations (which normally favor the status-quo) and raise at least twice its present revenues, by assessing all member nations as little as 0.1% of their GNI, to begin with, and gradually increasing that amount as the UN system expands its capacity to use the funds to good advantage.

3. **A UN Peace Corps (ch.12).** Increasing disenchantment with the UN and reversion to policies of nationalism stem largely from the SC’s inability to agree on peacekeeping measures in places such as Syria or from the minimal positive results of many under-resourced missions that it has authorized. The provision, through an elite UNPC, of robust responses in high-profile conflicts could reverse this trend and lead to new reform initiatives.

4. **An adequate planning mechanism.** Faced with a multitude of threats and challenges, the UN has responded periodically by authorizing commissions charged with making recommendations for systemic changes. While the resultant reports typically had considerable merit, they failed to challenge the faulty paradigm of the Westphalian system of sovereign states on which the current system is based. The debate should be reopened and needs to be carried forward over a period of many months, if not years, by a highly-respected group of statespersons and scholars willing to put the long-term interests of the world before the short-term interests of their home countries. If the UN is unable to undertake such an effort, progressive members of civil society should take the lead in doing so.

**QUESTIONS:**

1. *Why is a system of checks and balances an essential aspect of plans for democratic federal world government?*
2. Could the world stop short of creating a World Government and still function adequately in the generations / centuries ahead?

3. If there were to be a World Government, could we guarantee that it would be/remain reasonably democratic? How much would it matter if some nations initially failed to meet the usual expectations of a democracy? What methods have restrained tyranny in the past?

4. Can you think of actual cases in which non-democracies have evolved peacefully into democracies? How did that happen?

5. If there were to be a World Government, would it have to be federal in nature? Why do you feel as you do?

6. Why are “Bills of Rights” essential to functional constitutions?

7. What are the pros and cons of establishing a plural executive? (p. 310)

8. How much energy should globally engaged political activists devote to promoting governmental competence at the regional level?

9. Should powerful international organizations such as the WTO, OECD, and Bretton Woods organizations be brought under the UN umbrella for purposes of programmatic planning? If so, how?

10. Do you regard the four recommended initiatives (WPA, better funding, UN Peace Corps and better planning) put forward above as those most likely to find substantial support? Are there any you would downplay? Are there others that you regard as especially promising? If so, why?
Although virtually everyone yearns to be free from the scourges of war, terrorism, poverty and eco-catastrophe, there is still far too little commitment to working for those causes. A widely-shared sense of urgency is lacking. Thus, we drift ever closer to collective disaster. This can and must be reversed. We must muster the requisite will, wisdom and cooperative spirit to do so. And we must do so soon!

Throughout the book, we have put forward scores of proposals for substantial reforms of the present system of global governance that we believe are needed to enable humankind to cope with the perils of an ever-more-interconnected and interdependent world. Humankind has no viable alternative other than to plan for the future. But no reform plan, however logical and meticulously presented it may be, will have much value unless it is endorsed by a critical mass of decision makers and engenders in them a will to engage in meaningful action. In this Unit of our Study Guide we note some basic obstacles to change and some ways by which those obstacles might be overcome.

**Key Issues:**

The Domestic Political Climate: Global and local politics are inevitably intertwined. Over much of the world, however, the importance of global politics is little acknowledged. In particular, the question that looms largest in many democratic elections is “What is best for our country?” rather than “What is best for our shared planet?” Enormously wealthy MNCs – especially those tied to the so-called “military-industrial complex” in the US and its equivalent in a small number of additional major powers – dominate the political system to an inordinate degree and have little regard for the potential role of the UN system. Financial interests dominate many key institutions. By and large, the media are complicit. Nationalism reigns.

The Educational System: Support for nationalism – mainly benign, but often jingoistic – also characterizes most educational systems. From their earliest school years, children are indoctrinated into unquestioning loyalty to the State. This is true in most democratic states as well as in autocracies such as North Korea. An ethos of loyalty to the Earth and all
of its people is generally lacking. Curricula underplay the history, geography and cultures of areas outside one’s own country.

Civil Society: Although the number and influence of civil society organizations (CSOs) has increased by leaps and bounds during the past half-century, no way has yet been devised by which to efficiently integrate their wisdom and experience into our system of global governance. Additionally, civil society is still dominated by the global North and lacks democratic accountability.

Inertia and Sclerosis of the Present UN System: The inadequacies of the present UN system in responding to major global changes are notorious and not accidental. The Charter was written so as to make it difficult to amend, thereby preserving the stranglehold of the P-5 on the organization as a whole and foreclosing major structural reforms. The all-but-universal one-nation-one-vote method of decision-making is utterly unrealistic.

Lack of Coordination of Reform Initiatives: Given the difficulties cited above, it is hardly surprising that, over most of the world, initiatives to reform the UN system have gained little traction. Although small groups with a reform agenda may be found in a number of countries, especially in the global North, there are no widely respected leaders (other, arguably, than Pope Francis I) or NGOs forcefully making the case for an effectively reformed global governance system.

Possible Solutions (p. 320-334)

In the preceding paragraphs we have endeavored to present a candid reflection of the multiplicity and magnitude of the obstacles in the way of creating a workable world. Formidable though these obstacles are, we are convinced that fundamental reform is necessary and that failure to take timely action will exact an enormous toll in human suffering and environmental damage. There is no obvious place to begin. Nature, more than human agency, may determine our chief priorities. Catastrophes can force change. But why should we wait for the next catastrophe to make a start in putting our house in order? In response to the challenges noted above, we offer the following multipronged, long-term strategy for change:

Improving the domestic political and economic climate to facilitate working for reform: We must somehow create – or restore – a viable balance of concern for domestic and international politics and understand the links between the two. Citizens must reclaim political control from the
MNCs and oppose the military-industrial complex. Laws should enable the media to express unpopular political opinions without fear of retribution.

**Establishing a system of global education and encouraging development of a cosmopolitan ethos:** Schools must teach and nurture a *global ethos*, wherein all persons recognize themselves as members of a single human family, citizens of a common planetary home, and wards for the welfare of future generations. Educational systems must be substantively revised and deparochialized. The art of critical thinking needs to be cultivated. Opportunities for personally experiencing and learning from foreign cultures (including language mastery) should be greatly expanded.

**Creating effective civil society networks:** Effective networks of CSOs with related agendas must be forged and ways must be found whereby their collective voices and expertise can be given effective recognition (see the proposal for civil society coordinating councils in Chapter 10.) The North-South gap in regard to the effectiveness of CSOs must be reasonably addressed.

**Key reforms of the UN system:** Several key changes may serve as catalysts to set the engine of reform in motion. Devising a simple and reliable revenue-raising system can greatly enhance the capability of UN agencies and restore confidence in the UN as a whole. Establishment of a World Parliamentary Assembly should, over time, provide a forum for the voices of ordinary citizens and put pressure for reform on would-be democratic leaders. Adoption of realistic weighted voting in decision-making agencies should impart credibility and a sense of fairness to the decisions made. Creation of a UN Peace Corps should enable a reversal of the world’s costly and fruitless military build-up.

**Forging strategic alliances:** Although CSOs will likely lead the way, they must enlist the support of forward-looking, well-regarded and highly trusted democratic nations from both the global North and the global South. They alone have the legal standing to put reform initiatives before the GA, SC, (proposed) WPA and other UN agencies. Enlisting regional organizations should also prove politically useful. Active support from Nobel laureates and other renowned senior statespersons (preferably retired), philosophers, scientists, religious leaders (and faith-based bodies) and other shapers of public opinion could prove invaluable.
QUESTIONS:

1. We have limited our list of “possible solutions” to five high-priority topics, though many others would have been possible. Do you agree with our selection? If not, what should we have added or deleted?

2. If you were both pro-UN reform and a powerful shaper of public opinion, to which of our five areas for reform would you devote most of your attention? Why so?

3. Is incremental change the preferable way to proceed, or is wholesale change necessary? What are the pros and cons of each approach?

4. How might global demographic changes advance or impede UN reform efforts?

5. Given the trends and periodic counter-trends in the world, as you see them, what do you believe to be a reasonable date for having in place some approximation of the “workable world” that we envisage?

6. Suppose that there are certain countries that do not wish to take part in the reform process. Should the rest of the world go ahead without them, assuming or hoping that the hold-outs would eventually come aboard? If so, what, in your opinion, should be the critical mass needed to move forward? Why do you hold that opinion?

The United Nations aims to promote the welfare of future generations as well as to deal with present problems
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Our planet is a complex and interdependent organism.

Global problems require global solutions.

The world is my country, all of mankind are my brethren, and to do good is my religion. – Thomas Paine

The law of force must yield to the force of law.

National sovereignty conveys responsibilities as well as rights.

All human beings are created equal and are endowed with unalienable human rights.

Government should be of the people, by the people and for the people.

Enduring peace requires justice.
Justice requires binding and enforceable law.
Just law requires democratic government.
Therefore, enduring global peace requires democratic global government.

Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary. – Reinhold Niebuhr

When seeking to change a long-established political system, setbacks will be inevitable; but setbacks can be overcome.

The design of decision-making agencies affects the quality and legitimacy of their decisions. Well-designed global systems should be compromises that take into account the interests of diverse actors on the global stage. This can be accomplished by means of realistic weighted voting formulae.

Although Utopia is beyond our reach, we can create a workable, progressively better world.

It is not because it is difficult that we are afraid to act; it is because we are afraid to act that it is difficult. – Seneca

Where there’s a will, there’s a way.

Henceforth, every nation’s foreign policy must be judged at every point by one consideration: does it lead us to a world of law and order or does it lead us back to anarchy and death? – Albert Einstein

Nothing is as powerful as an idea whose time has come. - Victor Hugo
SUPPLEMENTARY RESOURCES

The volume of printed and electronic literature on the United Nations system, and more broadly on global governance, is enormous, exceedingly diverse and growing rapidly. Much as we would wish to provide our readers with a generous menu of the works available, we have here found it expedient to present instead a very limited list of readily accessible English language works written primarily for lay readers – including high school and college students – and published in the last ten years. Happily, a number of these works contain excellent bibliographies that will enable readers to explore more deeply particular aspects of global governance, as well as the system as a whole.

PRINTED WORKS


Weiss, Thomas G.: What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It, third edition. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2016. This work, by the leading US scholarly expert on the UN, diagnoses the system’s many shortcomings and prescribes a set of practical and achievable measures for either eliminating or mitigating them in the relatively short term.

Weiss, Thomas G. and Sam Daws (eds.): The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. An encyclopedic reference work comprising 40 chapters by 48 expert authors; deals with the theoretical premises underlying the UN system, the structure and work of the
principal UN organs, key UN activities, UN relationships with other actors, and prospects for reform.

**WEB-BASED RESOURCES**

**http://www.un.org/**
The website of the *United Nations* provides reliable, regularly updated and easily digestible coverage of news, statistics and other data, in multiple major languages. It also serves as a hub linking the various UN-affiliated agencies, each of which has its own site.

**http://www.un.org/news/**
*UN News Centre*, with the latest headlines from the United Nations.

**https://www.theguardian.com/world/unitednations**
*News stories* related to UN concerns, provided by *The Guardian*.

**http://www.wfuna.org/**
*World Federation of United Nations Associations*, “a global nonprofit organization representing and coordinating a membership of over 100 national United Nations Associations (UNAs) and their thousands of constituents. Guided by our vision of a United Nations that is a powerful force in meeting common global challenges and opportunities, WFUNA works to strengthen and improve the United Nations."

**http://wfm-igp.org/**
*World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy*, “a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization committed to the realization of global peace and justice through the development of democratic institutions and the application of international law."

**http://acuns.org/**
*Academic Council on the United Nations System*, “a global professional association of educational and research institutions, individual scholars, and practitioners active in the work and study of the United Nations, multilateral relations, global governance, and international cooperation."

**http://wgresearch.org/**
*World Government Research Network*, “Advancing the academic dialogue on global integration."

**http://wgresearch.org/annotated-bibliography/**
The *World Government Research Network* website includes an excellent annotated bibliography.
http://en.unpacampaign.org/
Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly, “a global network of parliamentarians, non-governmental organizations, scholars, and dedicated citizens that advocates democratic representation of the world’s citizens at the United Nations” (see Unit 3).

This article discusses the idea of a democratic federal world government (FWG). It includes the principles, history, and potential benefits of FWG, as well as responses to common critiques (see Unit 14).

Secretaries General of the United Nations

Trygve Lie
1946 – 1952

Dag Hammarskjöld
1953 - 1961

U Thant
1961 - 1971

Kurt Waldheim
1972 – 1981

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar
1982 - 1991

Boutros Boutros-Ghali
1992 - 1996

Kofi Annan
1997 – 2006

Ban Ki-Moon
2007 - 2016

António Guterres
2017 -